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1Survey data and methods are perhaps underutilized in the study of the causes and con-
sequences of corruption. This paper is intended to be introductory, and I focus here on 
survey resources that already exist that are available for secondary analysis. I begin with 
an introduction to survey methodology and its core feature of generalizability that is also 
its main advantage. In the second section I provide a (non-exhaustive) list of data sources 
with example questions which may spark ideas and the webpages where researchers can 
find out more. Thirdly, I outline some possible applications with reference to the litera-
ture on the drivers of corruption.
A brief introduction to surveys
A defining feature of survey methods is that the sample, if done well, is representative of 
a target population. It follows that statistical inference can be drawn: results from appro-
priate analysis of the sample can be generalized to the whole population2. This defining 
feature of the survey method is also its advantage, and where it can offer an important 
complement to other research methods in the study of corruption. Surveys are likely to 
be an efficient way to estimate average levels of experienced bribery in a given popu-
lation, in contrast to the use of conviction statistics, for example, which may well be a 
better measure of the ‘prosecutorial effort’ taken by law enforcement agencies than of 
the actual incidence of corruption (see Glaeser & Saks (2006) as an example of a study 
using conviction statistics, and Goel & Nelson (2011) for a critique). In addition, surveys 
can provide an efficient means to ascertain public perceptions of corruption, and to un-
derstand the level and consequences of moral attitudes towards corrupt behaviour.
The target population of a survey is often the population of a particular nation-state, or 
1   lindsay.richards@nuffield.ox.ac.uk
2   For an introduction to the method, see the relevant section in Bryman (2015) and for more 
details on sampling, see Kalton (1983). For a more advanced text covering the history of the 
development of survey methods and discussion of their epistemological and ontological 
implications, see Goldthorpe (2016).
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sometimes a more specific geographical region. However, surveys can also target bu-
sinesses rather than individuals, and sometimes more specifically ‘large businesses’ or 
‘multi-nationals’. The same principles of representativeness apply. Sampling is a crucial 
aspect of the survey method, since it determines the level of success in achieving a re-
presentative sample. It is worth pointing out that available secondary data from existing 
surveys are highly variable in this regard including among those listed in Table 1.
One of the downsides of survey research, which has implications even for secondary 
analysis, is that it is expensive. In cross-national surveys, the costs include the painsta-
king coordination effort to ensure that questionnaires, question wording, data collection 
techniques and so forth, are done in a comparable manner. It is cheaper to administer 
surveys by phone or internet, data collected by these methods may not be as reliable 
as data collected through face-to-face interviews. However, it is possible that response 
bias on sensitive topics such as corruption may be lower when the survey is not conduc-
ted face-to-face. These questions require consideration by the researcher (see Bowling 
(2005) for evidence on the mode of data collection and response bias).
Which surveys and where to find data
Corruption is by no means a mainstream topic in national surveys, but there are a number of 
well-known and widely-used surveys that have occasionally included a module on corruption. 
In addition, more specialised surveys are available such as Transparency International’s Global 
Corruption Barometer. A selection of surveys that are known to contain good measures of 
corrupt behaviours, perceptions, and attitudes are summarised in Table 13:
3   In this section, I draw on work I did on a review article which focussed on corruption in 
the developed world. Some of my examples will reflect this emphasis on corruption in de-
veloped countries, and it is likely that there are other excellent regional surveys that I have 
failed to list here. For the review article, see Heath, Anthony F., Richards, Lindsay and Nan 
Dirk de Graaf. “Explaining Corruption in the Developed World: The Potential of Sociological 
Approaches.” Annual Review of Sociology 42: 51-79 (2016).
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Table 1 Selected surveys with an example question, details of where to access them, and an 
example study 
Survey Example questions Where to access Example 
study 
International 
Social Survey 
Programme 
In your opinion, about how many 
politicians/ public officials in 
[country] are involved in 
corruption? 
See http://www.issp.org/ 
for general information; 
Data archived as GESIS 
http://www.gesis.org/issp/
home/  
Ariely & 
Uslaner 
(2014) 
Eurobarometer Over the last 12 months, has anyone 
in (OUR COUNTRY) asked you, or 
expected you, to pay a bribe for his 
or her services? (Police, Customs, 
Judicial services etc.) 
Data available via GESIS 
website 
http://www.gesis.org/euro
barometer-data-
service/home/  
Mungiu-
Pippidi (2013) 
European Social 
Survey (2004 
only) 
How often, if ever, has a public 
official asked you for a favour/ bribe 
in return for a service in the last five 
years? 
Data available at 
http://www.europeansocial
survey.org/  
Richards & 
Heath (2016) 
World Values 
Survey 
How widespread do you think bribe 
taking and corruption are in this 
country? 
Data available at 
http://www.worldvaluessu
rvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp  
You and 
Khagram 
(2005) 
International 
Crime 
Victimization 
Study 
During the past year, has any 
government official, for instance a 
customs officer, police officer or 
inspector asked you or expected you 
to pay a bribe for his service? 
Data available at 
https://dans.knaw.nl/en/sea
rch  
Nieuwbeerta 
et al. (2003) 
Global Corruption 
Barometer 
What was the approximate amount 
of money paid overall in bribes by 
your household in the past 12 
months? 
http://www.transparency.o
rg/research/gcb/gcb_2015
_16   
Email TI to request access 
Weber 
Abramo 
(2007) 
United Nations 
Office on Drugs 
and Crime 
Did you give a public official some 
money, a gift or counter favour on at 
least one occasion in the 12 months 
prior to the survey? 
Reports available 
http://www.unodc.org/uno
dc/en/data-and-
analysis/corruption.html 
Goel et al. 
(2012) 
Latin American 
Public Opinion 
Project 
Has a police officer asked you for a 
bribe in the last 12 months? 
Access or analyse online 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/
lapop   
Rose and 
Peiffer (2013) 
Latinobarometro Do you or any relative know any act 
of corruption in the last 12 months? 
Access or analyse online 
http://www.latinobarometr
o.org/lat.jsp  
Ruhl (2011) 
New Russia 
Barometer 
In dealing with any of these 
institutions in the past two year, was 
it necessary for you or anyone in 
your household to pay a bribe? 
Available at 
https://www.ukdataservice
.ac.uk/  
Rose and 
Mischler 
(2010) 
Afrobarometer If you ever paid a bribe…did you 
report any of the incidents you 
mentioned to a government official 
or someone in authority? 
Access or analyse online 
http://www.afrobarometer.
org/data  
Bailard (2009) 
World Business 
Environment 
Survey 
On average, what per cent of 
revenues do firms like yours 
typically pay per annum in 
unofficial payments to public 
officials? 
Data available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/R
V060VBJU0 
Donchev and 
Ujhelyi (2014) 
 
Notes: This is not an exhaustive list. Other high quality surveys carried out in individual countries 
also exist. Only one example question per survey is provided. The surveys may cover experiences, 
perceptions, attitudes, or some combination of these three aspects. See data documentation for further 
details 
 
 
Applications of survey methods to the study of corruption 
Survey research may offer some opportunities for detailed academic enquiry into the causes and 
consequences of corruption, and I suggest a few possibilities here. 
 
For teasing out macro-level from micro-level mechanisms 
The quantitative literature looking at country-level correlates of corruption has found a range of 
factors that predict, with some regularity if not universally, the level of corruption in a given country. 
The average level of education in a country reduces corruption (Uslaner and Rothstein, 2012), for 
example, as does social trust (Uslaner, 2004). Corruption also tends to be lower in countries with 
protestant backgrounds (Treisman, 2000). However, these macro-level correlations can leave the 
mechanisms unclear. What is it about Protestantism that reduces corruption? If the theorised 
mechanism is about the behaviours resulting from religious doctrine (e.g. Lambsdorff, 2010) then we 
expect that religious identity at the level of the individual is important. On the other hand, if more 
cultural explanations (Treisman, 2000) are theorised, then it is Protestantism at the level of the 
collective that will matter.  
Multi-level modelling (see Snijders and Bosker, 2012) with provides a means to tease apart the level at 
which the effect occurs and the results are illuminating in terms of the mechanisms. For example, 
education at the individual level seems to increase the probability of engaging in a corrupt exchange, 
while average education brings down overall corruption of a country. Protestantism at the individual 
level has no effect on bribery in Europe, suggesting that its effect at the country level does not depend 
upon morals and values (Richards and Heath, 2016). 
 
For the validation of other indicators 
The vast majority of cross-national studies of corruption have used one of the established composite 
indices, the best known of which is the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) produced by Transparency 
International (for details see Lambsdorff 2006).  Similar indices are produced by the World Bank 
(Kaufman et al 2004) and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). These have become 
invaluable campaigning tools and have been used in many of the most-cited quantitative studies of 
corruption. However, they are also subject to some discussion and debate on what exactly they 
measure and how well they capture the actual incidence of corrupt exchanges (for discussion and 
critique, see Philp (2006), Andersson and Heywood (2009), Donchev and Ujhelyi (2014)).  
Data from international surveys provides a means to validate, or elucidate, these composite indices. As 
an example, I show below a comparison of recorded rates of experiences of bribery and for CPI scores 
for European countries. In many cases we get a good match: for example, among this sample of 
European countries experience of bribery is most frequent in Ukraine, and Ukraine has a 
correspondingly low CPI score. However there are also plenty of anomalies: bribery seems far too 
infrequent in Turkey, for example. Among the countries with very low incidence of bribery, typically 
in Western and Northern Europe, there is variation in CPI scores. The survey data are as likely as 
Table 1    Selected surveys with an example question, details of 
where to access them, and an example study
Notes: This is not an exhaustive list. Other high quality surveys carried out in individual coun-
tries also exist. Only one example question per survey is provided. The surveys may cover ex-
periences, perceptions, attitudes, or some combination of these three aspects. See data do-
cumentation for further details
Applications of survey methods to the study of corruption
Survey research may offer some opportunities for detailed academic enquiry into the causes 
and consequences of corruption, and I suggest a few possibilities here.
For teasing out macro-level from micro-level mechanisms
The quantitative literature looking at country-level correlates of corruption has found a range 
of factors that predict, with some regularity if not universally, the level of corruption in a given 
country. The average level of education in a country reduces corruption (Uslaner and Roth-
stein, 2012), for example, as does social trust (Uslaner, 2004). Corruption also tends to be lo-
wer in countries with protestant backgrounds (Treisman, 2000). However, these macro-level 
correlations can leave the mechanisms unclear. What is it about Protestantism that reduces 
corruption? If the theorised mechanism is about the behaviours resulting from religious doctri-
ne (e.g. Lambsdorff, 2010) then we expect that religious identity at the level of the individual 
is important. On the other hand, if more cultural explanations (Treisman, 2000) are theorised, 
then it is Protestantism at the level of the collective that will matter. 
Multi-level modelling (see Snijders and Bosker, 2012) with provides a means to tease apart the 
level at which the effect occurs and the results are illuminating in terms of the mechanisms. 
For example, education at the individual level seems to increase the probability of engaging in 
a corrupt exchange, while average education brings down overall corruption of a country. Pro-
testantism at the individual level has no effect on bribery in Europe, suggesting that its effect 
at the country level does not depend upon morals and values (Richards and Heath, 2016).
For the validation of other indicators
The vast majority of cross-national studies of corruption have used one of the established com-
posite indices, the best known of which is the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) produced 
by Transparency International (for details see Lambsdorff 2006).  Similar indices are pro-
duced by the World Bank (Kaufman et al 2004) and the International Country Risk Guide 
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(ICRG). These have become invaluable campaigning tools and have been used in many of the 
most-cited quantitative studies of corruption. However, they are also subject to some discus-
sion and debate on what exactly they measure and how well they capture the actual incidence 
of corrupt exchanges (for discussion and critique, see Philp (2006), Andersson and Heywood 
(2009), Donchev and Ujhelyi (2014)). 
Data from international surveys provides a means to validate, or elucidate, these composite 
indices. As an example, I show below a comparison of recorded rates of experiences of bribery 
and for CPI scores for European countries. In many cases we get a good match: for example, 
among this sample of European countries experience of bribery is most frequent in Ukraine, 
and Ukraine has a correspondingly low CPI score. However there are also plenty of anomalies: 
bribery seems far too infrequent in Turkey, for example. Among the countries with very low 
incidence of bribery, typically in Western and Northern Europe, there is variation in CPI sco-
res. The survey data are as likely as composite indices to contain measurement error, so this is 
not a plea to ditch the indices. Rather, the survey data may provide an opportunity for greater 
specificity about the type of corruption in question.
Figure 1    Experienced bribery versus CPI score – Data: Transparency International and 
European Social Survey 2004
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Specificity
A connected point is about specificity. In order to advance academic research into the causes 
and consequences of corruption, we may need to move past correlations between broad brush 
measures such as CPI and GDP and develop more specific research questions relating to the 
type of corruption and its specific causes. It would be surprising if the causes and consequences 
of street-level bribery and grand corruption are equivalent, for example, or if extortion by a ci-
vil servant is equal to bribery in a private company (Heath et al., 2016). The detailed questions 
available in some surveys may provide opportunity to tackle these kinds of questions empirical-
ly.  In the Global Corruption Barometer, for example, distinctions can be made between bribes 
made to, for example, someone working in education, judicial services, and the land registry 
– it may be that some types of corruption may come about through extortion of the needy, 
others by control of the rich.
For analysis on the (causal) role of attitudes and norms
Social norms are frequently held as an explanation for levels of corruption in a given coun-
try. A simple argument is: where corruption and bribery are simply part of the culture, and if 
‘everyone is doing it’, the chances of moral objection are lessened, thus the corrupt behaviours 
are likely to continue. Many of the surveys mentioned above have detailed questions on moral 
attitudes as well as on perceptions and behaviours, thereby providing a means to further inves-
tigate the role of norms. The Global Corruption Barometer covers different scenarios in the 
form of vignettes, perhaps allowing more nuanced accounts of norms and culture. 
For example, in the 2009 survey respondents were asked “Imagine a… situation for your fri-
end, [a] shopkeeper. While he is applying for the business license, the public official he is dea-
ling with mentions the amount of paperwork and difficulties involved, but he still manages to 
issue the license. As he hands the license to the shopkeeper, he mentions how thankful many 
of his clients are for his work. A tipping box is located outside the public official’s office. The 
shopkeeper puts banknotes into this tipping box, roughly equal in value to five times the price 
of a good restaurant meal”
9
Figure 2    Acceptability of the shopkeeper’s behaviour (shown for a random selection of 
countries in the Global Corruption Barometer) – Data: Global Corruption Barometer 2009
In some countries with next to zero corruption, the moral attitudes are fairly relaxed. In the 
Netherlands and Switzerland, around half think this behaviour constitutes a bribe and over 
30% find the behaviour acceptable. Morocco and Mongolia are countries with higher (and 
similar) levels of corruption according to the CPI, yet the average acceptability levels are at 
opposite ends of the scale among this selection of countries. Further detailed analysis of these 
data may provide an opportunity to gain understanding of the role of norms.
Summary
> The advantage of survey data and methods is that they bring representativeness, 
 thus allowing inference about a population.
> Survey measures may be more transparent and specific than the composite indices.
> These data and methods can allow individual-level and country-level mechanisms 
 to be teased apart. Multi-level modelling appears to be a fitting, yet underutilized, 
 method to understand the drivers of corruption.
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1
During the past two decades, research on corruption has steadily been growing. It has 
gone from being a taboo subject, where it would only be referred to as the C-word, to to-
day’s state of the art where it is found across different social science disciplines; whether 
this is political science, psychology, economics or anthropology (Rothstein and Varraich 
2017). With this steady upsurge there has also been constant additions to the toolbox 
used for researching the subject. It is this toolbox that was the focal point at the work-
shop during the Interdisciplinary Forum “How to Research Corruption”; where not only 
the tools were discussed but also shared between the participants in order to further our 
own research interests.  It also allowed us to acquaint ourselves with methods that were 
unfamiliar to us. The “tools”, or rather methods, range from the latest fad of experiments 
to the less often used qualitative method of interviewing, as well as the mainstream sta-
tistical analyses. The aim of this paper is to present interviewing as a “tool” to research 
corruption. This will be done by answering two questions. First,  “why use it?” discussing 
both the advantages and disadvantages of the method. Second, addressing “what is it?” 
describing and explaining what interviewing (i.e. the data collection stages) involves. Im-
portant aspects of interviewing range from how to present yourself as the interviewer to 
how to keep a field diary. Finally, this essay will address the limitations of the method as 
a whole. Since this will be part of conference proceedings, the paper will limit itself to the 
data collection stages. 
Why use it?
First of all, what are interviews? Interviews involve fieldwork, where the researcher gets 
to have face-to-face interaction with the various stakeholders whom they are interested 
in. Let us begin with the first question that we ask ourselves when deciding what me-
1   aiysha.varraich@pol.gu.se
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thod to use in order to tackle a research question – why use this “tool”? In spite of the 
flack that qualitative methods receive, interviews carry many advantages (Sundström 
2015:11). Firstly, it captures real life. In this age of competing for research funding, the 
importance of why one’s research matters cannot be reinforced enough. No matter how 
strong and sturdy a theory we develop in the comfort of our offices, if the theory does 
not hold, or have “teeth” on the ground, it will fall apart. 
Secondly, tying in with the first point, it gives corruption a human face. Statistical ana-
lyses with all its advantages, are unable to give us insight into how corruption affects the 
day-to-day lives of people. Interview data provides the researcher with rich, unique data, 
situating corruption research into the local context. This helps to reinforce the relevance 
of corruption research both in academia but also in policy circles. 
Thirdly, interviews can help capture the unspoken, i.e. non-verbal cues such as body lan-
guage and silences, or something as simple as a change of expression – giving insight into 
how people feel about corruption. These perceptions matter, perception of a system can 
help make or break the systems in place. If you think the system is broken, you will not 
use it because you do not expect anything positive from it. For example, drawing from 
my own experience,  my visa expired when carrying out fieldwork  and my friends and 
colleagues advised me not to go directly to the visa office. They suggested that I pay a fee 
to a middleman who would “get the job done”. The reason they gave this advice is based 
on their collective perception that the government office was corrupt. Without heeding 
their advice, I went to the visa office, stood in the queue, paid the visa-extension fee, and 
within forty minutes my stay was regulated. There is a system in place, but it is handi-
capped when people refuse to use it because of their perceptions about it being corrupt.
Fourthly, interview data can help supplement, explain, validate and reinterpret quanti-
tative data. For example, combining interview data with statistical analysis can be extre-
mely useful. During a study of the sub-national variation of quality of government  within 
the European Union, our research team used regression analysis to establish correlation, 
and the strength of it between various variables, without the ability to point to causality. 
However, interviews were used to explain the patterns obtained as well as to untangle the 
causality between quality of government and corruption in the different sub-national re-
gions. Furthermore, interviews can also be helpful in designing quantitative tools, such as 
surveys instruments, by helping to hone in on areas that are of interest to the researcher. 
And finally, interviews appeal to different types of researchers. If you are good at talking 
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and enjoy socialising, you can put this skill to professional use. It gives you the chance and 
ability to make your research relevant to society; affords you the opportunity to interact 
with the society you are researching;  and also allows you to see first-hand the effects 
that corruption has on people’s lives and how they tackle it. Finally, it gives you a chance 
to get out of the office. 
What is interviewing?
As aforementioned, interviews involve fieldwork, where the researcher gets to have fa-
ce-to-face interaction with the various stakeholders whom they are interested in. There 
are different types of interviews: informal interviewing; unstructured interviewing; se-
mi-structured interviewing and structured interviewing. What sets these types apart is 
the level of control exerted by the researcher over people’s responses (Spradley 1979, 
Gorden 1975), which effectively will produce different types of data. The type of inter-
viewing and interview control exercised will depend on the type of research question one 
is addressing as each type serves different purposes. This paper will focus on semi-struc-
tured interviewing, the one I have most familiarity with and frequently used over the past 
six years of doing research on corruption.
What is it good for?
There are two main situations where semi-structured interviews are ideal: either when in-
terviewing experts, or when interviewing a respondent whom you will not interview more 
than once. The former are respondents that are in the habit of getting interviewed and 
are used to making efficient use of their time. The latter is a situation where you would be 
able to garner as much information within the given time from the respondent. 
The researcher sets the level of control for semi-structured interviewing by creating and 
using an  interview guide. This is a set of written, predetermined questions that allows the 
research topic to guide the interview process, thus ensuring that topics of interest are 
covered. How strictly you follow the guide is up to you as the researcher. In my case, it 
works as a framework within which to operate. I am able to follow a respondent’s lead and 
delve deeper into an area that I may not have thought about. Keeping it as a framework 
also allows for a more natural flow of conversation, where professionalism is easily main-
tained, and the guide can help veer back the respondent to the topic at hand in case a 
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tangent becomes too divergent. Also, and perhaps most importantly, an interview guide 
demonstrates that you are fully in control and ultimately it will help produce data that is 
reliable and comparable. 
The interview guide itself is an iterative process. Before embarking on fieldwork, we have 
to prepare an interview guide that details a list of questions, which best address our ov-
erarching research question. Many times, carrying out a pilot interview is essential to see 
how the questions are being understood by the respondent; as this allows one to gauge 
which questions are useful and which ones can be dropped. The pilot interview itself will 
serve as data, and also allow you to revise the guide if necessary. A note of caution: the 
interviewer should expect the interview guide to evolve continuously. Interviewing is an 
iterative process, as we interview, we may want to add/remove a question. It is important 
not to hinder this process but to hone the guide so that the limited time can be put to 
the best use. My fieldwork in Pakistan helped me realise this very aspect. I wanted to 
understand the exchange relationship between patrons and clients bound by religious and 
political affiliation. My initial question was “Does your saint (patron) have any respon-
sibilities towards you? And what are your responsibilities towards your saint (patron)?” 
This did not elicit much response but a sentence or two, during at least three interviews. 
But after having spent time in the field for a span of two weeks and mingling with the va-
rious congregations, I rephrased my question according to the lingo observed in the field. 
Now the question I posed was “what are your saint’s duties towards you?” This formula-
tion produced a list of different exchanges and expectations the clients had from their 
patron. This reinforced the importance of understanding that a data point can be reached 
through various paths, in this case through different questions. The process is simplified 
when the researcher is clear about what the question is trying to get at. Therefore, allow 
the interview guide to evolve, and as an aid to yourself, make notes in the margin of what 
purpose/end each question is aimed at - this helps clarify to you as a researcher the value 
of the question, and also whether you are actually gathering new data or merely repeating 
yourself. 
The process
Before elaborating on the process of interviewing, it is important to point out the main 
key to successful interviewing. The key, as Bernard puts it, is to “learn how to probe 
effectively – that is, to stimulate a respondent to produce more information, without 
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injecting yourself so much into the interaction that you only get a reflection of your-
self in the data” (Bernard 2006; 217). There are many types of probes; the silent probe 
(where the interviewer leaves space for the respondent to follow up without interrupting 
them), the “uh huh” (the one where elaboration is prompted by a mere “mm-hmm” or 
“uh huh”), long-question (the one where you pose a grand question and leave the reins 
with the respondent to take over), phased assertion (where you act as if you already know 
the answer and thus create an environment for the respondent to open up) as well as the 
echo probe (where the interviewer merely echoes what the respondent has said, allowing 
the respondent to delve deeper). The skill of probing one learns over time, and it can only 
be learned by actually interviewing.   
Now turning to the process itself, this can be divided into four stages: presentation of 
self, getting started, finishing up, and applying tools in the field. When presenting one-
self, there is one rule of thumb: honesty. The researcher should ensure to inform the 
respondent what the study is and what the research is about. Explain how and why you 
are interviewing them, and how you went about selecting them. At times respondents will 
tell you they probably cannot help you with much. It is your job as a researcher to explain 
that you are interested in their views and perceptions, and that you are there to learn 
from them. If the interviewer is honest and open, it will help establish a trust between 
both parties, allowing the respondents to open up. The physical presentation of oneself 
should be guided by common sense such as if interviewing at a government office, dress 
business casual, and if interviewing in a village setting, adapt to the way people present 
themselves around you. This will help make your respondents comfortable and help them 
to take you seriously. One difficulty I encountered while presenting myself pertained to 
my name. My first name, Aiysha, has historical connotations, signalling one to be Sunni 
Muslim and had the potential to compromise trust between me and potential respon-
dents from other Islamic denominations such as Shia Muslims2. I wanted to avoid using 
my name, but also maintain honesty. So I opted to present myself by my middle name – 
Kanval. This name does not carry any historical connotations and is still part of my actual 
identity thus allowing me to maintain honesty. 
2   After the passing of Prophet Muhammad there was constant tension regarding the next 
spiritual leader of the Islamic Ummah. When the fourth caliph, Hazrat Ali, was about to take 
office, he was challenged for the leadership by one of the Muhammad’s widows - Ai’sha. 
Hazrat Ai’sha went to battle against Hazrat Ali, and only conceded upon defeat. Therefore 
Shia Muslims, do not name their daughters Ai’sha (Hazleton, 2009).
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Rules of thumb for interviewers
Getting started there are a number of issues that the interviewer must remain diligent 
about; these include the protection of your interviewees identity, the “did I miss anything” 
question and your tools in the field. 
The issue of utmost importance is protecting your informant‘s identity, i.e. assuring your 
respondents that they will have anonymity and confidentiality. The respondents are trus-
ting you with information that at times can be sensitive, therefore, it is imperative that 
the researcher maintain their ethical duty of doing no harm. 
The second rule of thumb is one that is often overlooked, what I call “did I miss anything” 
question. When wrapping up an interview, it is important to ask the informant if there are 
any questions they thought you missed to ask. It will surprise you how much information 
this can trigger and also it allows your informants to talk, instead of you suggesting any 
answers. The latter is important as it will give you insight into their reality, instead of hea-
ring what you want. Furthermore, in wrapping up the interview, always make sure to offer 
the respondent to follow-up your research. This firmly indicates the weight given to the 
respondent in terms of their importance, but also helps to establish a network in the field. 
Finally, in the field the main tools of the researcher are a voice recorder (dictaphone) 
and a field diary. During the interview process, it is important to simultaneously take 
notes while recording. Scribbling notes can help capture an idea that occurs during the 
exchange, but also help record non-verbal cues. Practically, it is a backup in case the 
voice recorder malfunctions or the batteries run out. The field diary on the other hand is 
a good way to debrief every day, where impressions and memos can be recorded, these 
will provide a wealth of data once you begin analysing. Over and above this, as a resear-
cher you must obtain permission from your respondent if you can record the interview, 
whether this is by voice recorder or taking notes. Only then can you proceed to use these 
tools. Normally interviewees are comfortable in giving their permission to be recorded, 
however in the case that they are not, you will need to resort to note-taking. There are 
however ways to overcome the hesitation that respondents may display. One of the sim-
plest ways to overcome such a situation is to dispense control of the interview to the res-
pondent, by this, I mean something as simple as handing the recorder to the interviewee, 
telling them they can press the “stop” button whenever they feel they do not want to be 
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on record. This is not only a good way to gain trust, but also puts them in control and puts 
them at ease. However in the case that this does not work, taking notes and debriefing 
becomes ever so important. 
Warnings and limitations
If there are any warnings I can impart, it is to pace the study. I have the wealth of fan-
tastic methods books to thank for warning me that fieldwork can become tiresome. As-
king the same questions day in and day-out can become repetitive and uninspiring when 
done for months on end. The best preparation is to accept that it can get tiresome, and 
to schedule a realistic amount of interviews in one day while keeping in mind that one 
must debrief these on a daily basis. A second caution is the language. I conduct my own 
interviews, normally in the language spoken by the respondent, whether this is Swedish, 
English or Urdu. If you are new to the language, it can help to practice it before going 
out to the field, and familiarise oneself with idioms, inside jokes and layers that one is 
unaware of. Also, language provides local context, so familiarity with the local situation 
cannot be over emphasised. 
Interviewing, like other “tools” has its limitations, these include; cost, time and limited 
sample size. Carrying out fieldwork is brilliant, however it is also costly - financially, emo-
tionally and time-wise. It is an investment not every researcher can afford. Getting to the 
field and staying there has its costs. This can require funding that may not be inherent. 
The emotional cost can be great if one has a family or is a parent to young children (Ber-
nard 2006) since the time spent in the field can vary from a few weeks to months or even 
years. Furthermore, unlike statistical analyses, the sample size one can obtain remains 
limited; interviewing 20-30 people is considered a good amount, whereas a quantitative 
study will be covering data pertaining to 1000 people or more.  
Although the main focus of this presentation and write-up was the process of data col-
lection, it may be useful to briefly point out the data analysis process specifically for 
interview material. This can be divided into two main phases. The first phase requires the 
researcher to transcribe all the interview material. Analysis of the interview material be-
gins already at transcription. While typing up the material, one important piece of advice 
is to keep making notes within the transcripts themselves. The second stage is the overall 
process of coding. It is the more complicated stage where many forms of analysis can take 
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place. One type of coding the researcher can choose is thematic, where a scheme is pre-
pared and then coding based on it. Other than that, grounded theory is another method 
having a resurgence in the qualitative field. Here, the data leads the researcher to find 
themes using a bottom-up approach. Due to the limited space, I will not detail the enti-
re process here. Instead, I will recommend  two invaluable data analysis books that take 
the reader through a step-by-step coding process based on their own qualitative work, 
with examples and excerpts of how to go about analysing interview data. The first book 
is Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Source Book by Miles and Huberman (1994) 
and  the second one is Constructing Grounded Theory by Kathy Charmaz (2006). 
Finally, as a parting note let me repeat the excellent advice once forwarded to me - stop 
reading and start interviewing. It is the only way to learn and improve on this often over-
looked (at least of late in political science) tool for researching corruption.
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1 2
Experimental research in social science has blossomed in the last 30 years. Experiments 
are in general understood as the systematic analysis of causal relationships by using a 
specific research design. One of the main advantages of using experiments – besides 
the exploration of causal relationships – is the combination of several methods such as 
observation or surveys. Social scientists have started to use experimentation to test mo-
dels in almost every research field of social science such as voting and elections, media 
studies and political communication, committee and jury decision-making, coordination 
and cooperation as well as corruption. 
The workshop on “Experimental Research on Corruption” during the Interdiscplinary Fo-
rum “How to Research Corruption” gave the participants an overview and orientation on 
how to run experiments in social science in general and on corruption, in particular. The 
major goal was to show the potential of experimental designs in the field of corruption 
research. After giving an introduction to the important terms, logic and types of expe-
riments, we discussed certain quality criteria and challenges of conducting experiments 
with a special focus on lab experiments (Kubbe, 2016).
This method is mainly divided into laboratory, field and survey experiments. The distin-
ction is primarily based on the location, their level of analysis (individual or group), level 
of control- and validity, and the orientation along norms of economy and psychology 
(Kubbe 2016). Laboratory experiments are generally seen as the “gold standard.” A labo-
ratory setting allows investigators to control all aspects of the research environment, so 
that only the independent variables differ, any differences on the dependent variable can 
be attributed to manipulation, and thus offer support for causal inferences.
Field experiments take place outside the laboratory but allow the experimenter to retain 
some limited control over the central variables. At their best, field experiments can offer 
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a reasonable trade-off between internal and external validity through increased realism 
without too much loss of control. Finally, survey experiments combine laboratory and 
field experiment and offer the possibility to use large and representative samples. Indivi-
duals can participate independently of their location and there is no necessary need for 
the physical presence of the experimenter at the expense of less control. In the field of 
corruption research mainly laboratory experiments are used.
Experimental research on corruption has grown in the last years. Investigating corruption 
related behavior, like extortion, bribery, or conflicts of interest, through the means of 
controlled laboratory experiments has become more popular in the last decades. Prior 
experimental studies have focused on individual determinants of corruption and consider, 
for example, the influence of an individual’s gender, religion, culture, amount of wages, 
the amount of bribe, level of monitoring and punishment. 
Compared to qualitative interview-studies and archival analysis, experiments aim to sys-
tematically control and manipulate the environment to gain causal insights into social be-
havior and the psychology behind it, which is difficult or even impossible to achieve with 
the aforementioned alternative methods. However, at the same time, a very control-
led laboratory environment can be perceived as artificial by the participants, raising the 
question of external validity: Is the behavior shown by participants during the experiment 
representative compared to their usual behavior outside the laboratory? This question is 
of particular importance for researching corruption-related topics, as it entails potential-
ly immoral behavior. We therefore discussed extensively the advantages (causal interpre-
tation, control over confounding variables), and disadvantages (potential lack of external 
validity) of the experimental method with the workshop participants. Based on this, we 
discussed how the trade-off of these advantages and disadvantages shift from laboratory 
to field and survey experiments. For example, while laboratory experiments enable the 
most control over confounding variables, enabling a clear clean causal interpretation, 
they sometimes lack external validity, i.e. the behavior of participants during the experi-
ment is not representative of what these participants do outside the lab. Whereas going 
outside of the laboratory to do experiments in the field can increase external validity, 
since they take place directly in the environment where corruption-related behavior (like 
bribery, extortion etc.) might occur naturally. However, the field can introduce con-
founding variables that are not controllable due to the unstructured environment, which 
decreases the possibility to make clean causal interpretations of the result. Thus, the lab 
experiments are promising because even if a person’s individual act differ outside the 
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lab, these experiments are particularly useful to investigate relationships and interaction 
between people related to corruption.
By looking at published and unpublished experimental studies on the topic of corruption, 
we showed how experiments can be designed for the lab and field to study corruption. We 
then discussed how the results of these experimental studies relate to the real-world pro-
blem of corruption or unethical behavior. For this, we particularly looked at studies that 
attempted to link experimental findings to real-world corruption phenomena and had a 
lively debate on the external validity issue of laboratory results in the field of corruption 
(Alatas, Cameron, Chaudhuri, Erkal, & Gangadharan, 2009; Armantier & Boly, 2008; 
Gaechter & Schulz, 2016; Potters & Stoop, 2016). After critically reviewing and discus-
sing several studies and their experimental design in the group (i.e. Abbink, Irlenbusch, 
& Renner, 2000; 2002; Cameron, Chaudhuri, Erkal, & Gangadharan, 2009; Di Falco, 
Magdalou, Masclet, Villeval, & Willinger, 2016; Frank & Schulze, 2000; Lambsdorff & 
Frank, 2010; Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011; Weisel & Shalvi, 2015), we 
worked together on how to plan and conduct own experimental studies. The workshop 
was very interactive and every participant had the chance to present his or her own ideas. 
These ideas, for example, involved designing experimental economic games that try to 
mimic the incentive structure of bribery in the real world, by giving participants the 
possibility to “bribe” each other (i.e. transferring money) to receive a benefit, which can 
entail cheating other participants in the experiment. We also discussed possible effects of 
manipulations like punishment, probability of “getting caught”, or externalities.
In general, we gave an overview on how to implement experiments in the empirical rese-
arch on corruption, its advantages and disadvantages compared to other common social 
science methods and we discussed several potential projects on corruption that include 
experimentation in their designs.
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1 2
In this paper, we provide a brief overview of the main quantitative methods in researching 
corruption. We start with an introduction to the problem of measuring corruption and 
briefly elaborate on citizens and experts surveys as the main sources of data on corrupti-
on. We proceed by describing the main statistical methods and techniques used in cor-
ruption research. We also discuss the major benefits and pitfalls of quantitative methods 
in researching corruption and provide suggestions for future research. We conclude with 
a summary from the workshop on quantitative methods in researching corruption at the 
1st Interdisciplinary Forum “How to Research Corruption” in Amsterdam, June 2016, 
stating the main aims, topics discussed, and contributions from the participants. 
Introduction
Corruption, given its secret nature, is a phenomenon that is easy to sense yet hard to 
capture. It is a constant challenge for researchers, motivating them to develop scientific 
methods in approaching sensitive issues. According to Seligson (2005), the early rese-
arch on corruption focused mainly on official police and court records. However, official 
documents were soon criticized for showing a distorted and selective image of corrupti-
on. In order to overcome this ‘distortion’, corruption researchers gathered information 
from ‘corrupt’ actors, making investigative observations, interviews and public opinion 
questionnaires. The idea of ‘asking actors themselves’ has its roots in crime-victimization 
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approach, promoted by many criminologists (Kesteren 2007). Another alternative mea-
sure is to analyze the ‘traces of corruption’, gathering information from mass media or 
social media content, for example. Some of the methods of gathering information about 
corruption are favorable to specific methods of corruption analysis. In this workshop, we 
focused on the benefits and pitfalls of quantitative methods in analyzing corruption, with 
citizen surveys and expert surveys as the main data sources for the analysis. 
Data collection methods: citizen and expert surveys
Citizen surveys reflect people’s hands-on experience with corruption and their percep-
tion of the extent of corruption, providing an opportunity to investigate their behavior 
and opinions.  In corruption research, public opinion surveys play a vital role. Despite the 
noise that can be introduced by the reticence of respondents to answer sensitive ques-
tions (Azfar and Murrell 2009), public opinion surveys allow us to study changes in peo-
ple’s behavior, values and attitudes, causes for people’s propensity to engage in corrupt 
behavior and its consequences, as well as determinants of their perception of corruption. 
Surveys have been the major source of information about corruption so far. After the 
overview of innovative attempts to measure corruption, Nona Karalashvili, Aart Kraay 
and Peter Murrell (2015) note that “self-reports from surveys will continue to provide 
the basis for most research on and assessment of corruption in the future” (p.3).
Expert surveys provide the assessment of the extent of corruption within different bran-
ches of government on a national or regional level. When expert opinions aggregate to 
national level data, they lay a basis for comparing corruption levels between higher-level 
units, such as countries and regions1, which allows us to pose comparative questions: Why 
are some countries more corrupt than others? What are the causes and consequences 
of corruption for the nation state and its population? For example, the corruption data 
allow us to examine how corruption intervenes in the provision of public goods by the 
governments, how it slows down economic growth, disrupts trust between individuals and 
trust in the government.
Data analysis methods: statistical inquiry
The use of statistical methods helps identify patterns in the differences between the 
units of analysis (such as individuals or countries), while repeated data collection over a 
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period of time also provide the opportunity to analyze change. 
Statistical methods in researching corruption enable us to obtain a broad picture of what 
the relationship between the factors of interest looks like, identify patterns in analy-
zing large samples, and make conclusions on the observable patterns. Another advantage 
is that the results obtained during the analysis are applicable to more cases than what 
qualitative methods provide the opportunity for, and are generalizable under certain cir-
cumstances to cases outside the sample under investigation. This allows us to draw con-
clusions about the likely outcomes in other cases, which are not included in the original 
comparison. Including time perspective into the analysis allows for drawing predictions 
about the future and testing for causal relationships. In general, hypothesis testing provi-
des tools for eliminating rival explanations, which helps build more general theories. 
Statistical techniques in corruption research: overview
There are a few types of analyses one can do using statistical methods when investiga-
ting corruption. When comparing countries or individuals, OLS regression for continuous 
outcomes, as well as logistic regression for binary outcomes are common practices. Once 
a second level of analysis is introduced, it is common to use various multilevel models. 
A few examples of multilevel or hierarchical data analysis include studying the develop-
ments over time across multiple countries, studying changes in behavior over time across 
many individuals or studying differences between individuals across countries. Time-se-
ries cross-sectional as well as panel data can be modelled with:
> Fixed effects 
> Random effects/mixed multilevel models
> Pooled OLS with panel corrected standard errors
> Structural equation models
> Generalized method of moments (SYS-GMM)
> Bayesian framework creates a sound alternative to the frequentist perspective 
 and provides more tools for hierarchical modelling.
Using quantitative methods: benefits and pitfalls
Quantitative methods are widely used in the modern-day political and social sciences and 
help answer a variety of questions. In short, the main benefits of quantitative methods 
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based on citizen’s surveys and expert surveys in corruption research are (a) generaliza-
bility of results on population based on a representative random sample design; (b) op-
portunity and tools to estimate the corruption level; (c) opportunity and tools to create 
aggregate measures, which allow for comparative analysis; (d) ability to test the expected 
relationship between corruption and other country characteristics, such as economic de-
velopment, for example; (e) ability to test the expected relationship between corruption 
and individual attitudes or behaviors, such as political trust or voting behavior, for ex-
ample; and (f) ability to detect groups that experience corruption the most or to which 
corruption is most harmful. 
In terms of broader advantages, results of quantitative research can have specific policy 
implications and provide a basis for developing tools in fighting corruption. However, the 
quantitative data and methods often rely on a series of assumptions and should be used 
with caution.
The main pitfalls of the quantitative methods in corruption research are connected with 
the measurement problems and issues with statistical methods in general. Corruption 
measures are often subjective and reflect the opinion of a respondent rather than cor-
ruption facts and are only a crude proxy for a concept in reality: How well do corruption 
perception measures reflect actual levels of corruption? As most corruption measures 
are based on individual perceptions, answers to questionnaires about corruption from 
experts or individuals are highly sensitive to formulations of the questions. Therefore, one 
has to be careful with how much negative loading is being transferred in the formulations. 
Besides, perception of corruption in a country can be biased by factors other than actual 
corruption level, especially if the concept is too broadly defined in the questionnaire. For 
these reasons, the measures of corruption are highly likely to miss certain nuances that 
only in-depth qualitative research can pick up.
The challenges stemming from statistical methods on their own are that it is difficult 
to model the independent relationship between corruption and other factors, as there 
are other things that are likely to affect the relationship (such as the level of economic 
development or regime type) and interfere with the estimates. For this reason, it is dif-
ficult to establish causality between the factors and, therefore, problematic to answer 
the questions that statistical methods are designed to answer in the first place. A related 
problem is a problem of omitted variable bias. To exemplify omitted variables bias, one 
can consider the following: corruption is connected with many processes within the soci-
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ety, both those that are possible to measure and account for in a regression analysis and 
those that are intangible. If some of the significant unobserved factors are not modelled 
explicitly in a regression, their effect will instead be absorbed by the corruption measure, 
intimately related to these factors. Therefore, the results obtained from a regression on 
the effect of corruption can be overestimated or biased. To add to the list, the results in 
cross-country analysis are not generalizable outside the sample under investigation, as it 
is impossible to draw a random sample of countries. 
Research gaps
The quantitative research on corruption could benefit from a more diverse and sound 
data on corruption. As many existing measurements are suffering from differential item 
functioning problem, the research is in need of data collection efforts that would model 
different perceptions of what is meant by corrupt practices in the surveys across dif-
ferent cultures. Latent variable modelling provides tools for dealing with these issues, 
however, only few efforts have been made to employ latent variable modelling to measu-
ring corruption. Comparative studies would also benefit from alternative data to expert 
evaluations, such as coded media reports, highlighting corruption scandals, or coded legal 
documents on corruption regulations, which could be translated into English and be com-
parable across countries. Another way forward is to combine quantitative methods with 
qualitative in-depth studies or media discourse analysis effectively into a mixed method 
approach.
Concluding reflections
The aim of the session Quantitative methods in researching corruption was two-fold. 
First, the workshop served as a platform for presenting and discussing quantitative ana-
lytical techniques used to answer research questions on corruption. We discussed the 
issues of measurement, including problems with data collection and the use of existing 
corruption indicators. Second, the workshop involved a critical discussion of the bene-
fits and pitfalls of using quantitative methods in researching corruption. The workshop 
was divided into three parts: 1) the chairs held short introductory lectures on conduc-
ting surveys on corruption, performing cross-national studies, using existing corruption 
indicators and measurement issues; 2) participants presented their research with the 
following discussion; and 3) together we brainstormed about strengths and weaknesses 
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of quantitative methods.
As most of the workshop participants were from a non-quantitative research background, 
the main focus was on the introduction to quantitative methods, survey methodology, 
cross-national studies and quantitative text analysis in answering research questions 
about corruption. The discussion focused on determining benefits and pitfalls of each 
of the abovementioned quantitative methods in researching corruption, as well as par-
ticular substantial questions, such as what are the known determinants of corruption 
in cross-country research? Specifically, in the discussion, questions were raised on the 
relationship between corruption, unstable state situation, democracy level, and general 
social trust. During the workshop we also discussed available data for corruption research 
on the level of individual perceptions and experiences, characteristics of the survey data, 
its availability, changing trends in asking questions on corruption, as well as country bias 
in representing corruption levels. 
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1 2
Introduction: the topic of the workshop
First of all, we would like to thank all participants for a very interactive and productive 
workshop session! This workshop aimed to introduce the participants to qualitative me-
thods and their application to corruption research. Participants worked in groups of three 
and analysed three articles that applied qualitative methods—interviews, ethnography, 
focus groups—to research different types of corruption in different countries. The idea 
was not to discuss abstractly about qualitative versus quantitative research, but to look at 
actual pieces of evidence and their interpretation. Therefore, the papers were discussed 
focusing on the specific advantages and limits of each chosen technique.
The first goal was to show the contribution of qualitative methods in corruption rese-
arch, by showing how different types of data can give access to dimensions of corruption 
neglected or overlooked by other methods. The second goal was to debunk the myth that 
certain research topics demand specific methods, thus helping participants choose the 
most suitable method for their own research, or to make the most out of a given method.
State of research
At first, participants indicated their experience with qualitative and quantitative research 
methods, to facilitate a common understanding of the participants’ backgrounds. Im-
portantly, several participants did not fit this quali-quanti box, as they came from a legal 
background. Others had backgrounds in discourse analysis or document analysis. These 
turned out to be enriching contributions for the workshop. In general, few participants had 
carried out qualitative research themselves, but some were planning to do so in the near 
future. We then had a discussion on the underlying philosophy of science (see figure 1). 
1   c.o.brandt@uva.nl
2   flavioeiro@gmail.com
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Although there is not always a clear line separating the different approaches, qualitative 
research is situated more on the side of subjectivism:
Figure 1    Philosophy of science – Data: own elaboration based on Bryman (2012)
Let us take a closer look at these criteria for evaluating qualitative research 
and suggest some tips on how to make use of them (Bryman 2012): 
> Credibility: trustworthiness of the findings. The research is conducted according to the   
 canons of good practices, and others have the chance to verify the data and the analysis made.
 Respondents validation and triangulation are great tools to insure credibility. When possible, 
 always give priority to the use of already validated instruments shown in published research 
 (interview guides, participants selections strategies, etc).
> Transferability: “thick description” of the case studied enabling others to 
 evaluate possible transference of findings to different contexts.
 Use appendices or online only resources (for journals). If you must ensure respondents 
 anonymity, you can use fictitious names, as long as you provide enough 
 contextual information.
> Dependability: also known as “auditability”, concerns the keeping of complete records of 
 every step of the research in an accessible manner.
 This is something to keep in mind as the first step of the research. If you keep them all, 
 you should let your advisors and journal’s editors know that they are available.
> Confirmability: ensuring transparency in subjective research means making clear that the 
 findings are not influenced by personal values or theoretical inclinations. 
 Clear distinction between data and analysis.
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Subjectivism / interpretivism / constructivism
   > Credibility
   > Transferability
   > Dependability
   > Confirmability
Objectivism or positivism
   > Internal validity 
   > External validity
   > Reliability
   > Objectivity
 This distinction should be enough so the reader can make her own analysis of the “pure“ data 
 without confusing it with your analysis. Boxes can be useful.
In a next step, we gave an overview of key qualitative research methods:
Figure 2   Qualitative research methods (see especially Blundo et al. 2006; 
Bryman 2012; Russel Bernard 2006) 
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> Ethnography:
  “thick description” (Geertz, cf. Bryman 2012, 292) of the group/phenomena studied
 Can make use of different techniques
 Preferred technique for research with open questions and unstructured interviews
 “these methods […] involve the expertise of the experienced and isolated researcher 
 working on a single site.” (Blundo et al. 2006, 13)
 Participant observation: “does not lend itself well to the participant observation method, 
 given that it involves behaviours that actors tend to keep secret and entails risks 
 associated with the disclosure of ‘sensitive’ information” (Blundo et al. 2006, 18)
> Semi-structured interviews:
 Recording: sometimes useful, sometimes disturbing
 Analysis: transcription, coding, identifying key-words, categorising types of answers 
 Snowballing (selection of new participants according to information gathered 
 in prior interviews)
 Data saturation
 Sequential interviewing
> Focus groups:
 An interview with several people is not necessarily a focus group
 Focus on interactions (observer and moderator; who is dominant? etc.)
 Non-verbal manifestations (body-language, silence)
 Key role of moderator
 Homogenous or heterogeneous groups (and number)
This overview generated three key questions regarding qualitative research methods:
Question 1: How do you handle the tension between 
full disclosure of sources 
and anonymity of research participants?
Do you need to protect your research participants? The well-being of your respondents might 
be at stake here, so consider this question before starting fieldwork. Although anonymity can 
be the “easy answer”, consider the need to justify it to your readers and evaluators.
Although fictitious names are popular, they might not be enough. Consider the amount of 
contextual information you will need to provide in order to assure “transferability” to your re-
search (see above). It can be useful to take the anonymity to a broader scale in order to provide 
details of the case studied.
If you promised anonymity, you will need to do the best possible to protect them. Interviews 
with representatives of institutions do not need to be anonymised if these respondents speak 
in the name of the institution. However, these individuals may decide to go off the record. You 
can then decide to anonymise the entire case, and risk losing some credibility, or to insert the 
secret information without identifying where it came from.
To protect yourself and give more credibility to your research, you can ask respondents to sign 
participation forms. If you decide not to, make sure you can justify your choice.
Question 2: How does the researcher influence 
the research process?
Invariably, researchers influence the research process, in both quantitative and qualitative re-
search. Building a research design, choosing concepts, designing questions etc. In qualitative 
research, the particularity is the constant and direct interaction between researcher and the 
people who are talked to. Researcher positionality is a term to describe this matter. For instan-
ce, one ought to be aware of certain structural features (a white, upper-class man is perceived 
differently than a black upper-class woman for instance). Such positions are not deterministic 
of the research outcome and on the interaction with research subjects. More broadly, every 
researcher is influenced by “experience, education, personnel background, and so on,” (Yanow 
2009, 278). Awareness of these aspects is an important characteristic of good qualitative 
research, as they might influence they way a researcher understands the stories and narratives 
of interview partners.
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Apart from these intersectional categories, qualitative researchers are constantly faced with 
interpretations and representations of the world, and do not seek to portray it objectively. 
This process can be best understood as double hermeneutics: “The first hermeneutic belongs 
to those we are studying—the so-called actors in the situation: their interpretations of their 
firsthand experiences. This is the initial interpretive moment. The second hermeneutic is the 
researcher’s: the interpretations we make of situational actors’ interpretations as we participa-
te with them, talk with them, interact with and observe them, and read (literally or figuratively) 
their documents and other research-relevant artifacts” (Yanow 2009, 278). 
Question 3: How do you know you are done
with your data collection?
Qualitative research allows two approaches: a complete research design from the beginning, 
or an open-end research, where you start your fieldwork with some key people you want to talk 
to and build up from there (referred to as snowball sampling). In both cases, you should con-
sider a respondent-driven sampling, extending or adapting your sample. Eventually, you will 
recognize that new interviews do not bring up any more relevant information — your data will 
become saturated (Russell Bernard 2006). But research is also limited by time and resources, 
and sometimes you might have to stop although you don’t have the feeling to have fully achie-
ved everything. This should then be reflected upon throughout your writing. Plan your rese-
arch well in order to build the best (and not necessarily the largest) sample from the beginning.
Topics discussed during workshop 
Anthropologists researching corruption explain that they do not see research on corruption as 
a particular sub-discipline, but “as a stepping stone leading to other phenomena” (Blundo et al. 
2006, 4). Likewise, Anders points out that “often corruption is just one, often minor, aspect of 
civil servants‘ social lives.” (Anders 2002, 2). The texts that were analysed in the group-work 
tried to explore these issues.
Group work
Three excerpts of relevant empirical analyses were distributed and participants analysed them 
in groups of three. Participants received some guiding questions to go through the texts and, 
moreover, all groups received five general questions that they discussed in their subsequent 
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presentations:
1. Brief presentation of the paper (research questions, methods, actors and informants, 
    type of evidence collected)
2. What have we learned from the paper (that we didn‘t know before)?
3. How do the insights help you in your understanding of corruption?
4. Which are the advantages and limits of the chosen method for the specific research?
5. Which other methods could be used instead—or in complement—
    and which kind of data would be accessible then?
Addressing a key issue in corruption research, Blundo explains that empirical evidence suggests 
not a deficit of accountability, but rather an excess thereof. In this particular study he identifies 
four types of accountability: representational, vicinal, patron-client and peer accountability. 
Here, suffice to exemplify one of these types with the definition he provides: Vicinal accounta-
bility “concerns every individual as a social actor embedded in multiple networks of close belon-
ging. It implicitly obliges classmates, neighbors, members of the same ethnic group, brother-
hood or political party to mutually help each other, or risk moral punishment.” (Blundo 2015, 
148). One piece of empirical evidence illustrates this issue: Blundo cites an assistant regional 
director of environment: “When you’re in your home territory, there are interferences. When 
a brigade catches a delinquent and it’s someone you know, well, there is always this interfe-
rence. The problem will be resolved with your help, although the guy has committed an offen-
ce. You, you’re between the hammer and the anvil, that’s the problem!” (Blundo 2015, 149). 
Blundo’s approach makes clear that a sole focus on ‘formal’ accountability mechanisms—as is 
strongly advocated by proponents of good governance and anti-corruption discourses—does 
not recognize actual mechanisms and how they operate in reality. Such shortcomings cannot 
lead to sustainable solutions and will further lead to a misunderstanding of the term corruption.
Article 2: Rodrigo Zarazaga, 2014
Beyond describing all the roles brokers perform for their parties, this article presents a theoreti-
cal explanation for why brokers multitask. Brokers have the neighborhood knowledge required 
to perform political activities at the local level that no one else can do, or do so efficiently. This 
study shows that performing non-clientelistic roles prepare brokers better to execute cliente-
listic strategies. The research is based on in-depth interviews with 120 brokers and participant 
observation. The brokers were selected through the snowball technique. Prolonged firsthand 
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observation in the field allowed the author to capture the clientelistic machine at work.
One could assume that governing, campaigning, and supervising elections each requires diffe-
rent sets of skills, and therefore, politicians would resort to different brokers depending on the 
task. However, brokers’ actions show that this is not the case; politicians do not diversify roles, 
and brokers multitask. The article doesn’t show how voters actually reacted, focusing solely on 
brokers. Some departing questions were left with no answer due to the approach (for example, 
why voters abide by the clientelistic deal?).
Workshop participants considered a survey with voters as a complementary research technique 
in order to obtain more holistic results. They also discussed what we could learn through a focus 
on the patrons (competitive particularism).
Article 3: Anders, 2002
Anders does not consider corruption as deviant behavior but “rather embedded in a society 
where the modern division between the public office and the private is not the exclusive man-
ner of defining a civil servant‘s place in social space” and starts his analysis from the conviction 
that “State law is only one of the multiple sets of rules operating within the civil service of 
Malawi” (Anders 2002, 3). He offers an analysis based on the vernacular that denotes “any 
kind of illegal, dubious or shady deal or practice connected to the place of work or the office in 
the formal sector that serve the enrichment of the employee.” (Anders 2002, 5f) “Although 
people do not approve of it they will often talk about it in a rather ironic fashion acknowledging 
it as an intrinsic aspect of formal employment” (ibid). He thereby shows that “[t]he general re-
jection of ‘Corruption’ does not imply a clear and unequivocal rejection of practices considered 
to be corrupt among average Malawians” (ibid). This insight is important for researchers who 
try to interpret the respondents’ answers regarding corruption. 
Future research
We encourage researchers to pursue the use of qualitative research methods to study phen-
omena associated with corruption and not be afraid to explore topics that are traditionally in-
vestigated with quantitative research with qualitative methods. Linking single corrupt practices 
to the broader “corruption complex” (Olivier de Sardan 1999) is a necessary step to avoid mis-
representing people’s behavior and neglecting underlying power structures. Such an endeavor 
ought to be attentive not to confuse the “corruption complex” with a culturalist understanding 
of typical (e.g. ”African”) behavior (Blundo et al., 2006). Instead, embedding research on cor-
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ruption in broader issues of public bureaucracies and drawing on e.g. organizational research 
and research about  ‘the state’ has shown to be an important topic which still requires atten-
tion and further exploration (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 2014; Blundo et al., 2006). 
Finally, anthropological research has increasingly used narratives and discourses of corruption 
in people’s everyday life as an entry point to explore people’s understanding of bureaucracies 
and the state (Shore and Haller, 2005).
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1 2
Introduction
The aim of our workshop was to discuss different approaches on how to research corrupti-
on at the macro-level. The case of Ukraine is of special interest for two reasons. First, 
Ukraine represents a country where corruption is endemic and present in all spheres of 
life. Secondly, extensive anti-corruption reforms were introduced in 2014-15, without 
an accurate analysis of their long-term impact, which makes further research important. 
Practically, the workshop results will be used for designing future research projects at the 
newly founded Anti-Corruption Research and Education Centre in Ukraine (ACREC)3. 
In the workshop researchers from Ukraine, Germany, USA, Czech Republic, UK, Iran, 
Sweden, Poland, and Guatemala participated. 
One of the main ideas of the workshop was to analytically dissect the issue of corrupti-
on at the macro-level into several concrete research subfields. Thus, we introduced the 
following research sub-fields: political/grand corruption, systemic every-day corruption, 
and anti-corruption. 
For research of political/grand corruption, we identified the system of corruption appro-
1   oksanahuss@googlemail.com
2   nesterenkooksana1981@gmail.com
3   In addition to the Master Program in anti-corruption, the aim of the ACREC is to develop 
the research expertise on the high, internationally accepted scientific level. The research of 
the ACREC will address both, the study of corruption and anti-corruption.
Researching 
endemic corruption at 
the country level: 
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Oksana Huss1, University Duisburg-Essen
Dr. Oksana Nesterenko2, Anti-Corruption Research 
and Education Centre - National University 
Kyiv-Mohyla Academy
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ach as especially useful, for it allows studying structures and their functions, processes 
and dynamics, as well as placing actors in an institutional context, and analysing the con-
stellation of actors and their interaction. 
For research of systemic every-day corruption, the participants of the workshop pointed 
out the necessity to identify the core (or source) of corruption in each sphere of life: 
education, health care etc. This approach includes the identification of losers and win-
ners of corruption, as well as the elaboration of priority measures to address the core of 
corruption problem, the source of corruption incentives. Some participants stressed the 
process approach instead of the project approach as necessary to analyse corruption. 
For research of anti-corruption, workshop participants also stressed the importance of ela-
borating objective success indicators of anti-corruption reforms. As an initial step, a systemic 
analysis of the state of the art is crucial in order to study the evolution and impact of the on-
going anti-corruption reforms. During the workshop, we discussed two major methodological 
challenges in the assessment of new anti-corruption institutions. First, the stereotypes and 
perceptions of corrupt political institutions may distort the results of surveys on new anti-cor-
ruption institutions in the population. Second, biased experts may distort the results of the 
interviews, conducted in the new anti-corruption institutions. Interviewing experts is a com-
mon method in Ukraine for the assessment of anti-corruption reforms. The personnel of the 
new anti-corruption institutions is often represented in such assessment studies as “experts”. 
Thus, it is important to keep in mind that they are not impartial in the assessment of their own 
job. The workshop participants suggested using mixed methods in order to overcome poten-
tial biases in research. Moreover, using lab experiments and economic games could be useful 
to double check the results, because experiments are a good source to point out the causal 
flow of corrupt behavior. Besides, it is advisable to use indirect indicators for the assessment 
of anti-corruption reforms, such as quality of life or trust in society. The reason is that direct 
anti-corruption measurements based on the number of investigated corruption cases, for in-
stance, do not allow a distinction between cosmetic anti-corruption measures and real impact 
of anti-corruption policy.
An interesting discussion occurred around the political will to tackle corruption. While many 
experts appeal to the missing political will as the core problem for failed anti-corruption re-
forms, Persson and Sjösted suggest rethinking the concept of political will as “something being 
conditioned by underlying social contracts, rather than something emanating from a particular 
leader’s inherent qualities and wishes” (Persson/Sjösted, 2012:626)
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In summary, the workshop was helpful to structure corruption research at the macro-level and 
to identify important research gaps. The analytical structure suggested here can be helpful 
not only for the case of Ukraine, but also for the contextualization of corruption research at 
the country level worldwide. We include the results of the discussion into the structure of this 
summary. In addition, the summary contains some ideas initiated by the discussion with parti-
cipants of the workshop. 
The aim of this paper is twofold: first, we give an overview of different research fields, directly 
related to corruption as an “umbrella”-concept (Varraich, 2014). These will be further outlined 
in the following sub-chapters: 
1. Political corruption, including research of actors involved, their constellation, 
    institutional structures, functions and decision making processes; 
2. Systemic every-day corruption, including corruption research in different fields 
    of society, such as economic, education, healthcare etc.; 
3. Anti-corruption, including research of both, top-down (government and intergovernmental 
    organisations) and bottom-up (civil society, NGOs) anti-corruption initiatives. 
Second, for each subsection we provide a brief overview of the state of the art and identify 
research gaps that should be addressed in future studies. One important source of informa-
tion to study corruption at the country level, are cases investigated by prominent (investiga-
tive) journalists and active anti-corruption NGOs. Apart from scholarship by internationally 
renowned researchers such as Anders Åslund (2014), Andrew Wilson (2016), Henry E. Hale 
(2015), Taras Kuzio (2015) and Oliver Bullough (2014), the findings from the Razumkov Cen-
tre’s4 study on political corruption (2009), serve as a good foundation for the study of political 
corruption in Ukraine.
Political Corruption
As corruption is pervasive in Ukraine, for analytical purposes it is reasonable to differentiate 
between the system of political/grand corruption and systemic, every-day corruption in diffe-
rent spheres of society (Bussell 2015; Andvig and Fjeldstad 2001).
In the context of Ukraine, the concept of the system of corruption is appropriate to analyse 
political corruption (Huss 2016). The term system has been used in post-Soviet countries to 
4   Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies named after Olexander Razumkov is 
one of the leading think tanks in Eastern Europe and Ukraine
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define a specific type of governance structure, including formal and informal institutions, as 
well as structures and processes that influence participants’ behavior (Shevtsova 2005, 16; 
Karklins 2005, 13). Although referring to this term, the way, how the system of corruption 
operates in Ukraine was described in detail only recently (Huss 2016).
The system of corruption concept has to be differentiated from the notion of systemic cor-
ruption: while the concept of systemic corruption aims at describing permanently repeating 
corrupt practices and processes that follow a certain pattern, independently of the scale of 
petty or grand corruption, the concept of the system of corruption focuses on structures and 
governing forms of formal and informal institutions by means of corruption and aims to analyse 
the role of grand political corruption in all its forms for the political system. 
Importantly, the system approach allows a corruption analysis not only on the output (laws and 
regulations) and outcome (policy implementation) side of the system, but also on the input 
(influence from the “environment”) side of the system. On the input side in Ukraine, apart 
from society, oligarchs – owners of big business enterprises – play a crucial role in shaping the 
political system (Pleines 2009). For oligarchs, politics is business: they invest considerable 
amounts of private funds into politics for personal gain. Oligarchs influence politics in three 
major ways: first they own political parties5, representing their particular interests. Second, 
they personally hold key political offices, and finally they influence politics through mass media 
companies through ownership. This business logic – investing in politics with the aim to make 
profits - defines their political behavior, which illuminates the structural preconditions for lar-
ge-scale corruption in Ukraine. 
Thus, for the analysis of endemic corruption at the country level, the following should be ad-
dressed: the structure, the institutions (formal and informal) and their functions, as well as the 
actors and their behavior.
Studying oligarchs as interest groups
Political scientists study oligarchs from different perspectives: The prevailing question is, what 
is the role of oligarchs in the political system of Ukraine (Pleines 2009) and how do they 
influence regime trajectories (Melnykovska 2014). Another prominent research question is 
how do oligarchs adapt to the revolutionary changes and formal de-oligarchisation (Halling 
and Stewart 2016) and how do they maintain their influence (Wilson 2016). Some studies 
focus concretely on the reciprocal relationship between oligarchs and the President of Ukraine 
5   Owning political parties means in this context that oligarchs provide the main source of 
funding for political parties. They take decisions about key political positions in the party or 
become the leader of political party themselves.
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(Melnykovska 2015).
An interesting development was noticed after the Maidan revolution, which could become 
the subject of new research: oligarchs consider the penetration of civil society activities as 
a new strategy of maintaining influence (Leshchenko 2015). Against the background of the 
increasing role of civil society in Ukrainian politics, it is crucial to study the role of oligarchs. 
Are these wolves in sheep’s clothing, or do they fulfill an important function as intermediaries 
between society and the state?  
Studying corruption in political parties and elections
At the input side of the system, the role of political parties and political finance as well as 
corruption during elections is crucial (Huss 2016). Classical questions in this field of study are 
what types of political systems, finance, and election system increases or reduces corruption 
risks (Smilov 2007; Protsyk and Walecki 2007)? The Razumkov Centre’s study of political 
parties in Ukraine, focuses on their susceptibility to corruption, and shows the historical de-
velopment of political parties and details reasons for their increasing dependence on oligarchic 
funding (Razumkov Centre 2010).
Under conditions of major anti-corruption reforms after the Maidan revolution, big hopes for 
de-oligarchisation resulted from the new regulation to public finance for political parties. Thus, 
further research is needed, to find out under what conditions this reform can be successful. 
What are the indicators of success? And how to monitor this reform? Another issue worth 
investigating is a potential reform of the electoral system that currently bears unlimited cor-
ruption risks: for instance, regulation on funding of electoral campaigns and political adverti-
sements contains serious gaps, although these are the main items of expenditure for political 
parties and individual candidates. 
Studying political elites and the decision-making process
On the one hand, the analysis of political elites and informal constellations of power between 
political actors delivers findings about political influence beyond democratic elections. There 
are interesting sociological studies of political elites, their informal networks, and structures 
(Kostiuchenko 2011; Kostiuchenko 2012), as well as informal patron-client relations in politics 
(Fisun 2015). On the other hand, the analysis of the decision-making processes, communica-
tion of interests, and lobby work, shows that not only monetary corruption (bribes), but also 
political corruption in the form of clientelism and patronage play a crucial role in the political 
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system. The Razumkov Centre’s study “Political Corruption in Ukraine: Actors, Manifesta-
tions, Problems of Countering” gives a detailed overview of the corruption risks in the legisla-
tion process (Razumkov Centre 2009).
As a possible research gap, it would be interesting to study the “exceptions” - i.e. those few 
individual members of Parliament, who proved to be independent from oligarchic influence. 
Another interesting phenomenon to study in the Ukrainian Parliament is the faction of Eu-
ro-optimists, who used to be activists of civil society and joined Parliament after the Maidan 
protest. The Euro-optimists often promote the parliamentary legislation of critical laws, de-
veloped by civil society organizations. Another issue is the relation between formal and in-
formal institutions in the country and the question of how they are interrelated? Henry Hale 
(2015, 16) argues that in hybrid regimes like Ukraine, the constitution is more likely to shape 
informal expectations by pointing out the actors with ultimate power, than to be followed as 
a legal document. This assumption should be studied further. As a conceptual basis for such a 
study, one can use the model of interaction of formal and informal institutions, developed by 
Helmke and Levitsky (2004).
Studying corruption on the outcome side
The output side of the political system refers to the state of policy implementation through the 
bureaucracy. At the output side, major corruption risks occur when oligarchs and other actors 
of the business sector who invested into political parties and elections use politics to make a 
profit. Åslund (2014) and Bullough (2014) study corrupt schemes that make large scale priva-
te enrichment possible at the highest political level. To study corruption on the outcome side, 
it is useful to focus on sectorial policies, such as tax and custom services, public procurement 
policies, or ownership policies and state subsidies in the field of natural resources. For further 
research, the structural approach and detailed study of different corrupt networks and sche-
mes are necessary (della Porta and Vannucci 2012). Another aspect of research should address 
the international legal context of corruption in the big sectorial policies: the issue of money 
laundering regulations, and the use of foreign tax havens that enables business owners to hide 
their identity.  
Systemic every-day corruption in Ukraine
In Ukraine, the existence of grand/political corruption goes hand in hand with the widespread 
every-day corruption (mostly petty) at all levels and spheres of society, where ordinary citizens 
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are involved. With regards to corruption in Ukraine and a few other post-communist countries, 
Miller et al. (Miller, Grødeland, and Koshechkina 2001) coined the term ‘culture of corruption’ 
to describe the regional particularities of post-Soviet corruption, including the legacy of com-
munist-regime corruption. Based on a study of petty corruption in Ukraine, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, and Bulgaria, Miller pointed to the ‘corruptibility’ of citizens in the post-communist 
countries (Miller 2006). Corruptibility means that although the clear majority of citizens and 
officials condemn the use of presents and bribes, a plurality of citizens are ready to bribe if 
asked. However, in her study “The System Made Me Do It”, Karklins (2005) documents the 
tendency of citizens to blame ‘the system’ for the extent of such ‘corruptibility’ in their coun-
tries. Accordingly, Monika Bauhr introduces a conceptual differentiation between “need cor-
ruption” - when corruption is needed to gain access to “fair” treatment as opposite to “greed 
corruption” - special illicit advantages (Bauhr 2016).
Corruption and its consequences in society have been studied in the following fields: 
Economy
Closely related to corruption in the economy is the so-called shadow economy that is extre-
mely widespread in Ukraine. Very few authors in Ukraine are working on the methodology of 
an evaluation and definition of the shadow economy (Shumska and Nezhyvenko 2013). More 
research in this field is needed. Another approach to study corruption among firms are surveys 
to measure the perception of corruption in the business sector, indicating regional differences 
among firms (Denisova-Schmidt and Huber 2014). Additional research on compliance and 
transparent lobby work among firms is needed.
Education
Researching corruption in higher education is a relatively widespread topic. Studies are availa-
ble about a reform of the educational sector in Ukraine and the success of independent tests 
as a tool to reduce corruption during the application phase to universities (Klein 2014). The 
current trend in this field goes toward assessment of the broader context, such as a corporate 
culture of universities, and its influence on corruption (Zaloznaya 2012). However, there is a 
lack of experimental methods. As such, the use of experimental methods would be of advanta-
ge for the further studies (e.g. Kubbe 2016; Köbis et al. 2015).
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Healthcare
Research of corruption in the Ukrainian healthcare system is rather rare. However, several stu-
dies are dedicated to the issue, such as causes of corruption in the health care system and the 
development of administrative mechanisms against corruption in health care by the state (e.g. 
Popchenko 2008, Popchenko 2010), and the interdependency of low quality medical service 
and corruption (e.g. Radysh and Bilynska 2013).
Furthermore, the Anti-Corruption Action Center (AntAC) conducted a highly significant in-
vestigation of corruption in public procurement of medicine. The investigation unveiled mul-
tiple corrupt schemes, like kickbacks and embezzlement of large amounts of money during 
public procurement of drugs for treating AIDS, cancer, tuberculosis and hepatitis6. As a result 
of the investigation a new law on “reforming public procurement in the healthcare sector” was 
advocated by the AntAC and adopted by Parliament. This law transferred the responsibility 
for the procurement of drugs in Ukraine to international non-profit organizations, such as 
UNICEF and UNDP, preserving around 40% of the state budget for drugs from fraud.
The focus of further research in this field should be on the following issues: 
1. Detection and identification of the most common corruption schemes 
    in the health care system; 
2. Monitoring of the new public procurement procedures in the health care sector; 
3. Identifying the connection between low quality health care system and systemic corruption 
    at medical schools (Universities); 
4. Examining interdependencies of health care insurance (currently not obligatory in Ukraine) 
    and the level of corruption
Anti-Corruption policies
The revolutionary momentum, combined with strong pressure from international organizations 
(e.g. anti-corruption reforms are a precondition for IMF loans to Ukraine), resulted in the ad-
option of the new anti-corruption reform package by the Ukrainian parliament on 14 October
20147. However, this is not the first time such measures have been introduced in Ukraine: new 
 
6   Anti-Corruption Action Centre and All-Ukrainian Network PLWH (2013) “Who makes 
money on epidemics of HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis in Ukraine”, Kyiv. Available online under: 
http://network.org.ua/upload/novosti/zvit_Who%20makes%20money_eng.pdf. Also see article 
Oliver Bullough (2015).
7   Law ‘On the Fundamentals of Anti-corruption Policy in Ukraine (Anti-corruption Strategy) 
To Be Effective within 2014-2017’.
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anti-corruption laws have been adopted during every presidency since independence in 1991—
to no avail. Besides, latest studies show that wholesale reforms being imported from interna-
tional organisations may never help, unless these are tweaked and adjusted to local conditions 
(e.g. Easterly 2007). Researchers therefore should ask whether these latest reforms will fare 
any better, in other words what challenges are likely to encounter and what prospect they have 
of success? 
Anti-corruption reforms can be analytically divided into top-down anti-corruption policies and 
bottom-up anti-corruption activities.
Top-down anti-corruption policies
Detailed analysis of the anti-corruption reform package has been extensively presented in 
several independent reports, conducted, in particular, by Transparency International Ukraine 
(Kovryzhenko and Chebanenko 2015), the International Renaissance foundation (Voloshyna 
2015) as well as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
(ACN OECD 2015). According to “The Alternative Report on the Evaluation of State An-
ti-Corruption Policy Efficiency” (Voloshyna 2015, 3), this legislation completely regulates key 
sectors of anti-corruption activities in Ukraine and creates enough preconditions to develop 
effective state mechanisms that will help prevent and tackle corruption. The legislation envi-
sages the creation of two new specialized anti-corruption bodies - the National Agency for 
the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine 
(NABU). Additionally, a special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor Office (SAPO) was created. 
According to legal expert Prof Khavroniuk (2014), who focuses on anti-corruption, it is the 
first time the law clearly defines different types of corruption and means of its prevention 
accordingly. Corruption is criminalized in accordance with international norms and standards; 
different types of punishment corresponding to the corruption types are defined. This implies 
that the legislation aims to curb corruption as a systemic issue, which is possible only by com-
plexity measures. In other words, corruption should be tackled indirectly, for example including 
its prevention through education. Besides, the strategy indicates performance indicators and 
an annual public report on its implementation, which is an important improvement in compa-
rison to former strategies.
As described above, reforms bear challenges and new questions for further research. First, 
indicators and tools for the assessment and evaluation of the special anti-corruption institu-
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tions are needed. Second, in-depth studies of these new anti-corruption institutions – NABU, 
NAPC, SAPO - are required, to analyze shortcomings and success stories in the work and 
interaction of these institutions. Third, the issue of political will needs re-thinking as a complex 
interdependence of diverse factors that influence leading politicians in their decision making 
(Persson and Sjöstedt 2012).
Importantly, Ukraine has achieved some progress in creating legal provisions for whistleblower 
protection. Despite the absence of a separate law on whistleblower protection, the right of 
people to adequate protection is anchored in the law (e.g., Art. 11 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On 
Access to Public Information’, also Art. 53 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Prevention of Corrupti-
on’). The focus of further research in this field should be on the following issues: 
 
1.  examining the legal framework relevant to whistleblower protection for classified disclosures 
    and the intelligence community;  
2. assessing strengths and weaknesses of current legislation;. the focus should be on detecting 
    strengths and weaknesses of the internal and external reporting mechanisms and remedies 
    for whistleblowers, and should include academic assessment. 
3. indicating the most appropriate mechanisms for securing whistle-blower protection for 
    officials who blow the whistle about abuses of power, violations of law or other wrongdoing; 
4. studying public opinion regarding whistleblowers in Ukraine.
Bottom-up anti-corruption activities
Civil society organisations (CSO) play an important role in advocating anti-corruption reforms 
in the country and monitoring of the adopted legislation and its practical implementation (Ko-
vryzhenko and Chebanenko 2015). In line with the recent assessment of the National Integrity 
System (NIS) pillars, civil society, after anti-corruption agencies, became the strongest pillar 
of the NIS in 2015 (ibid). The relation between government and civil society changed radically 
after the Maidan events. 
All major anti-corruption CSOs participate in the Reanimation Package of Reforms - initiative 
that advocates reforms in various sectors of governance. This civic coalition developed its own 
agenda of priority reform measures, including anti-corruption, and actively promoted it. As a 
2015 OECD report states, the new administration often follows the lead of civil society and 
due to significant public pressure and high expectation of reforms, takes on board many of 
the reform measures developed by NGOs. For the first time, civil society experts were either 
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taking the lead or directly participating in the development of anti-corruption policy.
One of the best practice examples for bottom-up anti-corruption initiatives is the develop-
ment of ProZorro, the online platform for public procurement. A small group of young activists 
developed ProZorro on a voluntary basis, shortly after the Parliament introduced legislation on 
transparency in public procurement in 2014. Very early the activists received support from 
Georgian experts as well as an EU project on harmonization of the pblic procurement system 
in Ukraine. Thus, they created an e-auction system ProZorro that aims at transparent and ef-
fective public spending and corruption preventing through monitoring and competition among 
suppliers (Shatkovskyi and Fiveash 2015). Today, it is the most dynamic and popular initiative 
for public procurement worldwide8. Meanwhile, ProZorro is mandatory for all ministries and 
other central executive bodies.
Currently, research trends in the bottom-up assessment of anti-corruption are dedicated to 
the role of civil society in anti-corruption policies and that of Western actors in the develop-
ment and implementation of anti-corruption strategies. Similarly, as in top-down cases, re-
search-based assessment and effectiveness studies are needed to show the advancement of 
anti-corruption policy. Another interesting topic for further research is the interplay of diffe-
rent organizations, interaction and cooperation of civil society and the state in anti-corruption 
fields. Additionally, the role, motives and instruments of external partners – state govern-
ments and intergovernmental organizations –in the anti-corruption reforms of Ukraine should 
be investigated.
8   In May 2016, ProZorro received the international Procurement Leader Award for creat-
ing and implementing an electronic system with a unique architecture. See “ProZorro—the 
Best System in the World in the Sphere of Public Procurement,” Transparency International 
Ukraine, May 19, 2016, http://ti-ukraine.org/en/ news/monitoryng-deklaraciy/media/6039.htm
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1 2
Introduction into the topic of the workshop
Research of anti-corruption initiatives is inherently linked to the aims of successful an-
ti-corruption strategies and policies. The core of any anti-corruption reform should be 
the nature of the complex interactions between the initiator of the corrupt act and the 
person directly or indirectly engaged. Additionally, research should examine (official as 
well as non-governmental) anti-corruption reforms regarding their effect on and cost for 
society.
This summary follows the structure of the workshop “How to Research Anti-Corruption” 
and commences with a short overview of the most recent advances in this area of rese-
arch. It continues with the discussion of the main topics covered in the workshop such as 
anti-corruption phases and concludes with discussing examples of anti-corruption rese-
arch from Bulgaria and Romania as well as a cross-country anti-corruption agency index. 
The state of research in this area, the topics most discussed 
during the workshop, and possible research gaps
The first part of the presentation and the workshop was dedicated to the definition of 
corruption and the relation to good governance. The presentations were structured pri-
marily around a pragmatic- and practical-based approach towards the topic in contrast to 
a normative examination. The definition of corruption was formulated as a structural pro-
blem through the prism of legal, moral, societal and economic aspects. Traditional notions 
of corruption such as the interaction between the government/administration and the 
market economy/private sector were briefly covered. The accepted types of corruption 
1   stoyan.panov@gmail.com
2   sergio.gemperle@swisspeace.ch
How to Research 
Anti-Corruption
Dr. Stoyan Panov1, University of Freiburg
Sergio Gemperle2, Swisspeace, Bern
59
such as petty, grand and political corruption were also discussed. For example, a traditi-
onal definition of corruption is captured in the following lines as ‘behaviour that deviates 
from the formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) because of private-regar-
ding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains.’ (Nye 1967:416) A 
similar tenet is found in a more contemporary approach to what corruption may entail: 
“behaviour that deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the actions of so-
meone in a position of public authority because of private-regarding motives such as 
wealth, power, or status.” (Khan 1996:12)
The participants in the workshop, a mixture of master-level and doctoral students and 
researchers as well as practitioners in the field of anti-corruption, actively engaged in the 
opening discussion of forms of corruption such as bribery, fraud, favoritism and nepotism. 
Specifically, the participants contributed in a valuable and knowledgeable manner to the 
section on key factors for research, which included Klitgaard’s formulation of corruption 
as being the sum of monopoly power and discretion by officials minus accountability. 
Anti-corruption phases and approaches
Turning to anti-corruption research, first a brief review of traditional anti-corruption 
approaches and conceptions was provided. Common for these approaches is the under-
standing of corruption as a principal agent problem. Solutions thus focus on creating 
integrity agents through measures such as anti-corruption institution building, capacity 
building, improving legislation or public finance management and the subscription to in-
ternational standards in agreements or conventions. These strategies are mainly based 
on experiences of Western democracies and anti-corruption success cases such as Hong 
Kong or Singapore (cf. Beyerle 2014). 
The workshop continued with a lively discussion on the traditional anti-corruption strate-
gies and their applicability in terms of interventionism (the relevant authorities intervening 
post facto to the corrupt acts) and managerialism (a prevention mechanism for corruptive 
practices through robust systems, procedures and protocols). What was particularly inte-
resting in this section was the exchange of opinions about how to appropriately measure 
the two approaches and how to define aspects such as good governance. The workshop 
participants agreed that it is fairly unproblematic to discern and analyze the existence 
of sustainable political will and actual capabilities to respond to corruption practices. 
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The interdisciplinary approach towards researching anti-corruption frameworks exa-
mined the norms and values of the public officials and servants, the level of control and 
supervision, and the interrelation between the different branches of government, admi-
nistration, political interests and the business sector. The emphasis of the discussion was 
on the linkage between the values of society which influence the public awareness of cor-
ruption practices and the relevant response by the public and the state. The research of 
anti-corruption initiatives indicated a close examination of national integrity frameworks 
incorporating sustainable will for anti-corruption, the rule of law, and an improved and 
properly functioning economic system according do the rules of integrity. 
Particular examples from the anti-corruption efforts in the judiciary and high public offi-
cial sectors performed in Bulgaria and Romania were provided and analyzed. The evalua-
tion and research of the particular examples were a crucial part of the workshop as it 
became evident that the measurement mechanisms necessitate certain periods of time 
and monitoring of the anti-corruption practices which in both cases are performed by 
domestic and supranational actors such as national integrity agencies and the EU Com-
mission. The problematic aspects in terms of evaluating the success of the anti-corrupti-
on reforms in Bulgaria and Romania were extensively discussed. For example, what is 
the value of the internal and external measurement of success? Does a high rate of con-
victions in corruption cases correspond to a conclusion that the anti-corruption efforts 
are effective? What happens if there is an initial surge in the anti-corruption trials and 
convictions and then a backlash and more reserved approach within the judiciary takes 
place? Examples were provided in which initially the judiciary and the magistrates would 
be predominantly open to anti-corruption investigations while at a later point of time the 
same judges would be unwilling or hesitant to hear more cases or to pass prison convic-
tions as ‘the previous convictions were enough.’ 
The main problem centered on the notion of the self-sustainability of anti-corruption 
efforts and policies. During the course of the discussion, it became apparent that mea-
suring the sustainability of anti-corruption efforts may only be possible over time. Such 
anti-corruption efforts require long-term evaluation. Additionally, although court cases 
may provide reliable information about anti-corruption efforts, with the proviso that the 
judiciary is independent, transparent and honest, the dependence on conviction rates 
may mislead the reader. For example, statistics may include suspended convictions and 
under-charging in indictments and convictions for serious corruption crimes. In the long 
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term, it is necessary to see what happens to the convicted public officials and whether 
rehabilitation is successfully achieved and reflected in their subsequent official behavior, 
i.e. if they return to their corrupt practices after serving the conviction. This is a parti-
cular research gap that allows for analysis as it would necessitate the introduction and 
application of a long-term project which includes various political, administrative, socio-
logical and legal variables. 
Anti-Corruption research example: 
Anti-corruption agency index
In the final part of the workshop an example of an ongoing anti-corruption research 
project was introduced. The broader focus of the project is to analyze the effect of an-
ti-corruption reforms in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. More specifically, it is 
asked whether specialized anti-corruption institutions, such as anti-corruption agencies 
or commissions, have a positive effect on the legitimacy of other state institutions. To fa-
cilitate this analysis, an index which reflects the performance of anti-corruption agencies 
was constructed. The index combines indicators measuring the institutional capacities 
of anti-corruption agencies (also called input indicators), such as their political inde-
pendence or the financial and human resources, and the mandate of the anti-corruption 
agencies in terms of different functions like prevention, coordination or investigation 
(output indicators). In the light of general questions of anti-corruption research, the 
anti-corruption agency index was then critically discussed, including its conceptual diffi-
culties regarding anti-corruption policies such as differing underlying norms, difficulties 
of measurement and validity or the potential for policy recommendations.
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1 
Introduction
This workshop addressed inter-relations in societies between formal and legal norms, on 
the one hand, and informal and social norms on the other hand. The two forms are often 
consistent and complementary, but occasionally they contradict each other, in which 
case the tension becomes significant.
Both social and legal norms are directly relevant as to causes of corruption, and both are 
thus important for legal compliance and enforcement.  They are a strong motivation for 
human behaviour in daily life. Considering this background, the workshop aimed at ad-
dressing the role of social and legal norms in fighting corruption, and in anti-corruption 
law enforcement. More specifically, the workshop set out to examine the following three 
questions:
1. Given the two types of norms as noted above - the formal, institutional ‘legal’ norms, 
    and the informal, non-institutional ‘social’ norms - what are the strengths and 
    limitations of each type in fighting corruption? More specifically, what type of
    social norm can promote the rule of law, or, alternatively, be an obstacle and 
    hindrance to implementing a legal norm?  
2. What has been missing amongst current anti-corruption legal norms? 
    How can we improve and supplement these areas?
3. What are success stories or failures, e.g. country examples, corruption cases, 
    institutional arrangements, policies etc.? 
1   kotomimoriguchi2013@gmail.com
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The state of research in this area
What we call ‚informal practice‘ can sociologically be considered in two ways. The first 
sees informal practice as inherent in national culture, shaped by historical contexts. Cul-
ture represents ‚values‘, leading not only to certain behaviour but also shaping cultural 
perceptions. (Adler, 1977, Hofstede and Bond, 1988, Kwok, 2006) The second sociolo-
gical approach understands informal practice as derived from popular resistance against 
other social norms, which are imposed by new rulers or socio-economic and political 
changes. (Hofstede, 2001, Kwok, 2006)  
Although legal and social norms have long been the subject of extensive research, they 
recently received closer attention. These concepts have been found particularly useful 
for the understanding of legal reforms and transformations during the post-Communist 
East European democratisation process beginning in the early 1990s. This research has 
also re-evaluated the political and economic dominance of communism in Eastern Euro-
pe during the Cold War. (Gelman 2001, Ledeneva 2001, Mungiu-Pippidi, 2005, Grøde-
land, 2006, Dobovšekand,B., 2008)
Furthermore, social and legal norms have been applied to analyse acts of corruption from 
an aetiological point of view after the enactment of international and regional anti-cor-
ruption legislation in the early 2000s, bringing more attention to the issue of corrupti-
on, and how to combat and prevent it. The current interdisciplinary emphasis on this 
socio-legal area of study cuts across sociology, political science, criminology, and law, 
broadening the perspective for all disciplines.
Topics most discussed during the workshop
Participants in the workshop were from various disciplinary backgrounds, including politi-
cal science, sociology, and psychology as well as different cultural backgrounds. This en-
couraged the exchange of experiences, stories and perceptions of successes and failures 
in the battle against corruption, resulting in learning from each other‘s individual experi-
ences and knowledge. For instance, participants from countries in both Asia and Africa, 
mentioned low wages of customs officers as a driver of corruption, especially given that 
the officer‘s salary can be insufficient to meet basic needs, such as adequate education 
and medical care for children. In other words, it is seen as not only acceptable but even 
socially required, to develop available informal income sources which help provide for 
basic family needs.
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Overall, unfortunately, we did not have adequate time to discuss in-depth the speci-
fic legal issues on what has been missing amongst current anti-corruption legal norms 
(agenda question two). Therefore, we focused on issues like strengths and limitations of 
social/legal norms; which types of social norms may promote the rule of law as well as 
success stories or failures in particular countries. The main aspects of the discussion will 
be outlined below.
We began by defining the notions of social norms and legal order, as many participants 
were interested in finding out how these two differ and interact.  
According to Licht, a ‘social norm’, in general, is the collection of various acts which 
determine how people are expected to behave, not only based on law, but also more 
broadly on values and ethics, and including influence of religions, customs and traditions. 
(Licht, 2003) A legal norm, on the other hand, is only one type of social norms, a much 
narrower concept, considered to make up the system or rules which are applicable and 
effective (Razm 1980) and expected behaviors’ to citizens (Shavell, 2002)  by states and 
authorities.
As said above, these two types of norms are at times consistent and complementary, but 
occasionally contradict each other. Historically, legal norms are known in every society. 
During the workshop, cultural roots and backgrounds of these norms were discussed, 
including those of the current common international legal framework and modern public 
international law (Orakhelashvili A, 2006), and also of de-colonisation processes that 
had an important influence on social and legal norms in certain regions, e.g., south Asia 
and Africa.
Regarding the third question, case studies of corruption were discussed, including pat-
terns and suggested causes of corruption for practices such as bribery, professional mis-
conduct, and embezzlement. For example, although bribery in the public sector is, in 
formal terms, illegal everywhere, in some local contexts, forms of bribery are perceived 
as scandalous, whereas in other contexts they are indulged as either routine practice, or 
a low enforcement priority. There seemed to be a clear impact of local social structures 
upon the degree to which corrupt practices were tolerated or not prosecuted. This led 
to questions as to whether policy differences, such as institutional enactments and re-
sources devoted to combating corruption, could be significant as ameliorating factors, or 
whether cultural factors were so powerful that it was difficult to fight corruption using 
any institutional or policy tools.
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Possible research gaps
As noted above, the topic of legal and social norms is not new, but it has become the sub-
ject of renewed attention. There is both a great opportunity and need, especially for case 
studies, which concretise the causes and environments that lead to either law-breaking 
or the violation of moral standards categorised as corruption.
Researchers focusing on institutional systems and frameworks, can benefit from this 
broader perspective of observing social norms as well as legal and institutional arrange-
ments, especially in a comparative setting because the forms and causes of corruption 
are very diverse and differ depending on regions and countries. Similarly, societies and 
social groups in each region and country are also diverse, where social norms are obvi-
ously a key aspect in understanding/identifying the root causes of corrupt practices. The 
more thoroughly we identify and observe those social norms with a significant impact on 
corruption, the more effective and useful our research will be.
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Introduction
The Panama Papers by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) 
marks the biggest fraud-related data leak in the history of journalism (Obermayer, Ober-
maier, Wormer & Jaschensky, 2016). The economic costs of the revealed tax evasion 
affect the poor disproportionally: it is estimated that tax havens cost poor countries at 
least $170 billion in lost tax revenues each year (Oxfam International, 2016). Among the 
persons exposed were famous athletes but also political leaders and public officials from 
various countries. Some politicians have faced considerable criticism, such as the former 
Prime Minister of Iceland Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson, who was forced to resign 
amid public protests following the Panama Paper revelations. And even though the ICIJ 
strategically withheld parts of the data to publish them periodically, public interest has 
faded relatively fast (see Figure 1). Many accuse the media for the lack of public outcry. 
Indeed, in order to grasp the sheer size of the revealed data, but also to understand the 
meaning of the information, news media play a crucial role. But is the media to blame 
that the Panama Papers did not shake the world?
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Figure 1   Google Trends chart illustrating the number of search enquiries for “Panama Papers” 
within the year 2016
In order to enable an informed discussion about the media’s role in the public response to 
the leak, we first provide a short introduction to the Panama Papers. After that, we brie-
fly review the existing theories on the role of media in society in general and for anti-cor-
ruption in particular. Finally, we outline how scientific research, journalism, and other 
anti-corruption efforts can make use of the Panama Papers in their efforts to understand 
and fight corruption. One goal of this contribution is to put the Panama Papers on the 
map of corruption research and illustrate its potential for interdisciplinary collaboration.
What are the Panama Papers?
The way the Panama Papers came into being reads like the script of a spy movie. It all started 
in 2014 when an anonymous source reached out to the German Newspaper “Süddeutsche 
Zeitung” (Obermaier et al., 2016). What this source offered was classified and encrypted do-
cuments from the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca. Since the amount of data was too 
large for one newspaper outlet to process, the Süddeutsche Zeitung opted to analyze the data 
in cooperation with a cross-national investigative journalism project, the International Con-
sortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ). This work on the Panama Papers spanned over 80 
countries, involved more than 100 media organizations and 400 journalists. The documents 
indicate that Mossack Fonseca has been selling more than 200,000 anonymous offshore 
companies around the world. 
Owning an offshore account is not illegal per-se and as Stephenson (2016) points out “firms 
like Mossack Fonseca might also often provide services that are (appropriately) legal”. Yet 
off-shore accounts are an integral component when engaging in illegal financial operations 
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such as tax evasion, money laundering and kleptocracy. Ostensibly offshore accounts or shell 
companies appear as legitimate businesses. They have founding documents, a CEO and do-
cumented employees. However, their managers – often made up of lawyers and accountants 
– only perform duties in order to keep up the appearance of a legitimate company. These shell 
companies pose an immense challenge for international financial oversight authorities becau-
se the real owner of the company’s assets often remains unknown. Such practices can only 
flourish in an environment where a strict banking secrecy framework is paired with very lax, to 
non-existent, national oversight laws on financial transactions. Such conditions predominantly 
exist in small island countries such as Panama or the Cayman Islands, hence the name tax ha-
vens (Hines Jr & Rice, 1990). 
Although such offshore dealings have been long suspected to exist, the Panama Papers provide 
extensive hard data on the subject and illustrate a wide dissemination of the practice.  They 
provide “a window into the shadowy and often sordid practices that the very wealthy - inclu-
ding corrupt public officials and their cronies - use to hide their assets” (Stephenson, 2016). 
The most publicly debated example of corruption linked to the Panama Papers was Iceland’s 
Prime Minister Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson walking out of a television interview when 
asked about his offshore accounts. More recent revelations indicate that the populations of 
many African countries have suffered severely under tax evasion and corruption enabled th-
rough offshore accounts at Mossack Fonseca as “entrepreneurs and corrupt officials across 
Africa have used shell companies to hide profits from the sale of natural resources and the 
bribes paid to gain access to them” (Shane, 2016). Given the immense societal costs, such as 
missing tax revenues, that have been exposed through the Panama Papers, how come there 
has not been more consistent public outcry about it? In order to answer this question, we first 
have to take a look at the role of the media in society in general and as an anti-corruption force 
in particular.
A brief primer on journalism and anti-corruption
In democratic societies, media are part of checks and balances and fulfill normative political 
functions (e.g. information, socialization, articulation, control). Often referred to as a ‘fourth 
estate,’ the media monitor compliance with democratic laws, values and rules (Starke, Naab, 
& Scherer, 2016). However, in contrast to the legislative, executive, and judiciary, mass media 
have no formal means to sanction misconduct by corrupt public officials; therefore, they exert 
their public control indirectly. Stapenhurst (2000, p. 3) distinguishes between tangible and 
intangible “ways in which journalism serves as an impediment to corruption”. 
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Tangible effects describe the media’s normative role as a watchdog to hold political decision ma-
kers accountable for their actions (Norris, 2004). One way to do so is to expose wrongdoings 
by public officials such as tax evasion and corruption. This way, mass media can support “the 
prosecutorial institutions by investigating and reporting incidences of corruption” (Camaj, 
2012, p. 2-3). In the ideal case media spur investigations by official bodies and convictions of 
corrupt political actors (Stapenhurst, 2000). 
Mass media also provide a civic forum for voicing complaints and thus contribute to forming 
public opinion. By “highlighting policy failures, maladministration by public officials, corrupti-
on in the judiciary and scandals in the corporate sector” (Norris, 2004, p. 119) the media can 
generate public pressure to force corrupt politicians to resign and to lose political power. A de-
monstrative example of this type of influence by the media is the aforementioned resignation 
of the former Icelandic Prime Minister. A loss of reputation of corrupt politicians as a result 
of media coverage can also be considered to be a means of indirect control since reputation 
is a major power resource for politicians. Such media effects require investigative media to go 
beyond just being passive observers and, instead, actively engage in uncovering misconduct 
(Starke et al., 2016).
A controlling press can also have a preventive effect (Stapenhurst, 2000). Deterrence theory 
(Becker, 1974) is a standard external cost-benefit perspective that generates three hypotheses 
as to the forces that are expected to increase the frequency and magnitude of corruption: (1) 
high magnitude of external rewards, (2) low probability of detection, (3) low severity of punis-
hment. If the media fulfil their watchdog role, there is an increased likelihood for incumbents 
that their misconduct is exposed and consequently for them to suffer criminal prosecution, a 
loss of reputation or power. Thus, the personal benefit of corruption decreases, and potential 
perpetrators are deterred from engaging in corruption in the first place. However, in order 
to successfully deter corruption among public officials, exposure via media, strict anti-cor-
ruption laws, and effective prosecution via strong institutions of justice need to complement 
one another. If official sanctioning institutions are weak or even corrupt themselves, potential 
perpetrators do not have to fear punishment (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2013). Related to 
the Panama Papers, in order for the revelations and the ensuing media coverage to produce 
tangible effects, the governing institutions need to possess sufficient means to prosecute pow-
erful offenders, be it of tax evasion, corruption or other forms of criminal activity.  
Besides such tangible effects, media can also have intangible anti-corruption effects. They 
can be described as “those checks on corruption which arise from the broader social climate 
of enhanced political pluralism, enlivened public debate and a heightened sense of accounta-
bility among politicians, public bodies and institutions that are inevitably the by-product of 
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a hard-hitting, independent news media” (Stapenhurst, 2000, pp. 2–3). Empirical support 
stems from studies that show that information supply has a positive impact on government re-
sponsiveness (Besley & Burgess, 2002) and accountability (Khazaeli & Stockemer, 2013) and 
that public access to information is a powerful deterrent of local capture (Reinikka & Svensson, 
2004). Moreover, journalists can raise awareness of problems associated with corruption and 
shape social norms about prevalence and moral evaluation of corrupt behavior within societies. 
Empirical evidence highlights the importance of a general anti-corruption culture (Fisman & 
Miguel, 2008), corruption awareness (Goel, Nelson, & Naretta, 2012), and perceived social 
norms (Köbis, van Prooijen, Righetti, & van Lange, 2015; Starke, Köbis & Brandt, 2016) as 
important means to fighting corruption.
Why did the Panama Papers (not) shake the world?
These different ways in which investigative journalism might curb corruption are of course very 
normative and paint a very optimistic picture and some of these mechanisms also apply to the 
Panama Papers. In this case, the role of the watchdog was performed by the ICIJ, “a global 
network of more than 190 investigative journalists in more than 65 countries who collabora-
te on in-depth investigative stories” (International Consortium of Investigative Journalism, 
2016). The data leak and the resulting exposure of widespread misuse of shell companies on 
a global scale triggered not only public protests (e.g. demonstrations against the PM of Ice-
land), or parliamentary questioning (e.g. of the PM of the United Kingdom) but also policy 
changes. In the aftermath of the Panama Papers, the German secretary of finance Wolfgang 
Schäuble proposed new tax laws in order to cut down on the use of offshore account for tax 
evasion. These cases exemplify the potential of watchdog journalism to induce changes in the 
political system. Whether or not the Panama Papers have any preventive effects by deterring 
potential perpetrators from engaging in offshore accounts in the first place is still debatable at 
this point, but the enforcement of stricter tax laws most probably will. However, the concrete 
implications witnessed in Iceland, the UK and Germany provide some best practice examples. 
Of course, in majority of cases, the culprits implicated in the Panama Papers were not legally 
prosecuted or even investigated and in most countries policies remained unchanged. 
Such cases elucidate the oftentimes limited power of the media as an indirect control mecha-
nism. Changes in policies can only occur if policy makers attend to that matter as a result of 
media coverage. In this regard, an active civil society plays a crucial role by applying pressure 
to political decision makers to introduce new or improved policies. Since the onset of social 
media platforms, it has become easier for citizens to contact public officials directly, to make 
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their voices and opinions heard and to partake in political debates (Sundar, 2004). In terms 
of political content, Social Networking Sites (SNS) such as Facebook or Twitter are predomi-
nantly used to receive information about politics, to engage in political discussion with other 
peers or to observe conversations between politicians and other users (“background listening”, 
Crawford, 2009, p. 528). However, active participation in political issues and direct interac-
tions with politicians are on the rise (Ancu & Cozma, 2009; Emmer, Wolling, & Vowe, 2012; 
Gustafsson, 2012). Taken together, the media can play a crucial role in the fight against tax 
evasion, corruption and other forms of criminal activities by public officials. However, the ef-
fectiveness hinges on the respective level of corruption in which the media platform operates 
and consequently the effectiveness of formal prosecution institutions. It is often assumed that 
media furthermore influences whether and how the public reacts to such scandals, yet exten-
sive empirical data on this issue is lacking. In the next paragraphs we thus outline a current 
research design that tackles that question. 
How the Panama Papers can be used as 
a source for corruption research
Besides being a source for research on illicit cash-flows, tax evasion and corruption, the Panama 
Papers have also inspired a research project on the role of media framing on readers’ inclination 
to act against corruption. We outline this particular research project, which emerged from the 
Interdisciplinary Corruption Research (ICR) Forum. An interdisciplinary team of researchers 
investigates potential media effects on the perception of responsibility and collective action in 
response to different forms of corruption (Köbis, van Prooijen, Righetti & Van Lange, 2016). 
We draw on the framing theory (see for more details on framing theory, Iyengar, 1991) that 
distinguishes between thematic and episodic news frames. While episodic news frames rather 
focus on single events, instances, and certain individual actors, thematic news frames provide 
more background information and cover an issue in a more analytical way (Papacharissi & 
Oliveira, 2008; Starke & Flemming, 2015). Thus, both types of news frames tend to attribute 
both causal (Who is responsible for causing the problem?) and treatment responsibility (Who 
is responsible for solving the problem?) differently. Iyengar (1991, pp. 15–16) concludes that 
“episodic framing tends to elicit individualistic rather than societal attributions of responsibi-
lity, while thematic framing has the opposite effect”. Building on this theoretic approach, we 
investigate the influence of media framing on responses to public scandals such as corruption 
and tax evasion. More specifically, we experimentally test to what extent episodic and thematic 
framing impacts moral emotions and perceived responsibility with regard to political scandals. 
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For that purpose, we generated and pre-tested a total of four newspaper articles: Two articles 
depict a case of tax evasion through a Panamanian Law Firm (‘Panama Paper article’) and two 
describe an instance of revolving door, a form of public corruption (‘Revolving door article’). 
For both the Panama Paper article and the corruption article, we then manipulate whether an 
individual is portrayed as the primary culprit (episodic frame) or whether the incident is prima-
rily described as the result of loopholes in the system (thematic frame). Using a between-sub-
ject design, we then assess the responses to these different articles. To be more precise, we 
measure a) emotional reactions, both using a classic scale and a novel more intuitive measure 
of emotions, b) perceived responsibility c) reported willingness to engage in collective action 
and d) actual inclination to support anti-corruption. We hypothesized the following: 
1. Episodic news frames induce people to feel stronger moral emotions 
    compared to thematic news frames.
2. Episodic news frames induce people to perceive lower public responsibility 
    on corruption eradication compared to thematic news frames. 
3. Thematic news frames induce people to engage in collective action 
    more strongly compared to episodic news frames. 
With this research project, we hope to obtain crucial new insights into the way in which media 
portrayals of public scandals contribute to emotional responses and collective action.
Summary
The Panama Papers mark an unprecedented data leak. The last time such large-scale corrupti-
on was caught red handed was the Nixon era Watergate Scandal where the media actively 
exposed the internal corruption of the administration and eventually that exposure lead to 
not only to the introduction of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977 but it also 
became a starting point for USA to lobby for legislation similar to the FCPA in Europe and 
the rest of the world. Whether the Panama Papers will trigger comparable efforts to fight 
corruption remains questionable. To enable a better understanding of what the Panama Papers 
actually are and how they can be used as a subject and source for corruption research we make 
a threefold contribution. First, we provide a short overview about the emergence, size and con-
sequences of the Panama Papers. Specifically, we zero in on the role of the media. We illustrate 
how the media contributes to anti-corruption in general and its role in shaping the response to 
the Panama Papers in particular. This way, we discuss factors that shaped the media’s reaction 
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to the Panama Papers. Second, we illuminate how scientific research, journalism, and other 
anti-corruption efforts can make use of the Panama Papers in their efforts to understand and 
fight corruption. Third and finally, we conclude by outlining an interdisciplinary research pro-
ject that brings together scholars from three different disciplines (social psychology, political 
science, communication science). The study is based on the Panama Papers and investigates 
the effect of news media framing on public perceptions of responsibility for corruption. 
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